



# A set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks

## Appendix 1

of GUIDEBOOK on security measures  
for religious sites & communities




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
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Faith-based organizations



# **A set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks**

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for religious sites & communities

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## Introduction

This document provides a set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the consequences of terrorist/extremist attacks at places of worship and large religious gatherings and protect the relevant stakeholders.

All the procedures should be implemented in accordance with any national laws and respect any regional or local regulations or conditions which may be different among Member States.

Concerning the overall security objectives, it was found that response and mitigation were the areas of greatest need with the largest gaps requiring procedures specifically designed and developed for places of worship and large religious gatherings. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for a trained ‘Incident Manager’ and a ‘Welcome Team’ (security and/or volunteers) together with their ‘Interoperability with Emergency Services’ were considered essential for developing effective and efficient capabilities to implement the full set of procedures in an emergency situation. Concerning the security objectives of prevent, protect and detect, it was found that implementation of standard security measures could generally be relied on; these have been carefully considered and set out in the ProSPeReS ‘Security by Design Guidebook’. The overall emphasis of the procedures can be illustrated as follows:

**Figure 1 – Procedures alignment to security objectives**



The procedures are intended for implementation acknowledging the many and various differences between places of worship concerning their security and emergency management arrangements. The set of procedures have been designed using the following principles:

- **Simplicity** – for a non-technical/non-expert audience by using plain language and presented as checklists and bullet points wherever possible; this will also support easier translation from English to other languages.
- **Trainability** – to be easily transformed into training materials and building upon existing good practices already recognised and trained in the security and counter-terrorism sectors.

- **Transferability** – to be complementary and transferable to other deliverables across the project using commonly defined terminology; particularly in the case of the public awareness campaign (WP7). The procedures will be maintained as an open working copy to remain adaptable for that purpose.
- **Scalability** – to be applicable and usable primarily for large religious gatherings but also scalable and applicable to smaller ones wherever possible.

The set of procedures include the following:

- **GUIDE** for incident managers of terrorist/extremist threats and attacks - defines the role, responsibilities and procedures for the incident manager at the place of worship (essential for all types of emergency management) in the context of a terrorist/extremist threat or attack. This could be a Head of Security or other specially trained senior member of staff. In majority cases, it is necessary to consider that a rabbi, priest, imam or other religious leader would be the person 'in charge' of a large religious gathering (and in immediate control of the public address system) and may need to be trained in this role and procedure. The procedure also sets out the capabilities the incident manager will need to rely on in their role to successfully implement the procedure.
- **GUIDE** for interoperability with the emergency services - sets out a series of good practises so the place of worships receives (and supports) a fast and efficient response from the emergency services to a terrorist/extremist threat or attack through advanced joint planning, plans and exercising.
- **GUIDE** for developing a Welcome Team - sets out how a team can be formed to receive worshippers and visitors at large gatherings and events who are trained and exercised in security and emergency procedures to provide an increased and improved capability for the place of worship in detecting, deterring and delaying general security threats - including terrorist/extremist threats and attacks.
- **ADVICE** for the public to stay safe during a terrorist/extremist attack - sets out the public awareness campaign materials on this topic (WP7) and the set of procedures builds on these principles and complements them; it should be recognised they are not procedures to be implemented by the place of worship.
- **ADVICE** for the public to stay safe during a CBRN incident - sets out the public awareness campaign materials on this topic (WP7) and the set of procedures builds on these principles and complements them; it should be recognised they are not procedures to be implemented by the place of worship.
- **ACTIONS** to take IMMEDIATELY following a CBRN incident - sets out a procedure to recognise, assess and react to a CBRN threat/attack; including a quick, effective and low-cost method of immediate decontamination that could be managed by staff/security/welcome team if trained accordingly.
- **OPTIONS** for the emergency response to a terrorist/extremist threat or attack – sets out a summary of the various tactical options available to the incident manager/staff.

- **GUIDE** for evacuation planning – sets out how to implement a full, partial or zonal evacuation in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or fast-moving incident such as an explosive, firearms or weapons attack. The procedure should be applied and adapted to the particular design, layout and infrastructure of the place of worship or event. An evacuation plan could be developed from the procedure by adding maps/floorplans identifying all evacuation routes with supporting notes about each option. A section on communications is also included.
- **GUIDE** for invacuation planning – sets out how to implement a full, partial or zonal invacuation in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or fast-moving incident such as an explosive, firearms or weapons attack; including the identification/development of protected spaces. The procedure should be applied and adapted to the particular design, layout and infrastructure of the place of worship or event. An invacuation plan could be developed from the procedure by adding maps/floorplans identifying all invacuation routes with supporting notes about each option. A section on communications is also included.
- **GUIDE** for lockdown planning – sets out how to implement a full, partial or zonal lockdown in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or fast-moving incident such as an explosive, firearms or weapons attack. The procedure should be applied and adapted to the particular design, layout and infrastructure of the place of worship or event. A lockdown plan could be developed from the procedure by adding maps/floorplans identifying all invacuation routes, safe rooms and protected spaces with supporting notes about each option. A section on communications is also included.
- **ACTIONS** to take when a suspicious item of mail, package or substance is discovered - sets out how to react to these items in a format that can be used as a reminder to staff, to record the details and make an internal report. An illustration of suspicious characteristics can also be used as a training aid.
- **ACTIONS** to take if a bomb threat-hoax is received - sets out how to react to these items in a format that can be used as a reminder to staff, to record the details and make an internal report.
- **ACTIONS** to take when a suspicious item is discovered - sets out how to react to a potentially suspicious item reported or found; provides a checklist to decide if it should be treated as lost property or suspicious and what actions to take if it is considered suspicious.
- **CHECKING** your venue for suspicious items – sets out how to organise a reactionary or defensive search.

# 1. GUIDE for incident managers of terrorist/extremist threats and attacks

The incident manager has overall responsibility and authority for decisions and resources during an emergency. In the case of a terrorist/extremist threat or attack the aim of the incident manager is:


- Protecting people (and property) from harm by keeping them as safe as possible
- Deterring and delaying the threat/attack as much as possible
- Informing the emergency services with timely and accurate information while waiting for them to attend and deal with the threat/attack

In the case of most large-scale events and large gatherings, there should be an event plan that contains emergency procedures clearly defining roles, responsibilities and the actions to be taken in the case of various emergency situations. This should include the role and responsibilities of an incident manager in charge of the response on behalf of the place of worship. The incident manager should act in accordance with the plan. When the emergency services are involved and integrated into the event or large gathering, the incident manager for the place of worship will usually act on the guidance and instructions of the emergency services to support the overall response to the emergency situation by communicating and coordinating the response of the place of worship.

In the case of events and large gatherings without an emergency services' presence and without a specific event or emergency plan, there should always be a nominated incident manager in place to take responsibility and authority during an emergency situation. Put simply, somebody must have responsibility for leading and coordinate the response during an emergency situation; they should know they are the responsible person, and staff should also know who is responsible so they are ready to implement any decisions that are made. The incident manager will hand over the management of the threat/attack to the emergency services as soon as possible after their arrival; the incident manager for the place of worship will continue to act in a supporting role to the emergency services by coordinating the response of the place of worship.

In the case of a terrorist/extremist threat or attack the incident manager must conduct steps mentioned in Figure No 2:

**Figure 2 – Steps made by incident manager**



## 1.1. MAKE a first assessment:

- Consider if the threat/attack is credible and requires a response or not.
- Based on all the currently available information, recognising it may be incomplete.
- Establish as much as possible about:
  - What has happened? (it's nature, scale)
  - When did it happened? (Timeline, ongoing or not)
  - Where is the threat / incident / attack? (Location(s), weapons involved, static or moving/changing)
  - Who is involved? (Attacker(s), descriptions, direction of travel, casualty types/numbers/location(s))
  - Why has it happened? (motive/explanation, context)
- Initiate enquiries to fill any information gaps and then update/maintain situational awareness.
- Confirm if the emergency services have already been informed, if they provided any guidance or instructions and if they are attending.

## 1.2. INFORM emergency services

- It is critical to alert emergency services about a credible threat/attack immediately so they can mobilise their resources to attend. A nominated person should do it and report back when it is done. An uncertain situation can also be reported to the emergency service for their general information and to receive advice from them.
- Make the fullest possible first report (or updated/second/confirmatory report) as soon as possible. The ETHANE structured report (Figure No. 3) to provide the key information needed by the emergency services:

**Figure 3 – ETHANE structure report**



- ✔ **Exact location** - precisely where the threat/attack is, what part of the site/building(s) are affected, report where any attackers were last seen and where they were going
- ✔ **Type of incident** - what type of incident/threat/attack (suspicious package, bomb threat, active shooter, attack with a bladed weapon etc.)
- ✔ **Hazards** - what hazards/potential hazards are involved (possible explosives, weapons seen/used, CBRN materials etc.), report description(s) of the attacker(s)
- ✔ **Access** – what are the best routes for emergency access and exit (consider options from any plans previously agreed/held by emergency services)
- ✔ **Number of casualties** - how many and what type of injuries
- ✔ **Emergency services** – which ones and how many are there, which ones and how many are needed for the specific threat(s), hazard(s) and impacts of the emergency situation

#### Important highlight:

Assume that an updated/second/confirmatory report should be made after your first assessment so emergency services can be updated, confirm their expected attendance/time, and confirm/update any previous guidance or instructions that were given and provide any updated advice.

### 1.3. DECIDE on the first actions

- ✔ Recognise THEY must take personal responsibility to manage the response to a credible threat/attack until the emergency services attend and take over.
- ✔ Follow any guidance or instructions given by the emergency services.
- ✔ Decide to implement the best tactical option(s) to protect people (and property) to keep them as safe as possible while waiting for the emergency services to attend and deal with the threat/attack. This may involve a mixture of evacuation/invacuation/lockdown depending on the characteristics of the site and the assessment of the threat/attack.
- ✔ Implement measures (if possible) to deter and/or delay the attack while keeping people as safe as possible.
- ✔ Recognise that quick decisions may be needed about evacuation / invacuation / lockdown to keep people safe based on incomplete information about the threat/attack.
- ✔ Delaying decisions while waiting for more information may put people at increased risk from the threat/attack.

### 1.4. COMMUNICATE decisions and instructions

- ✔ To staff - about evacuation/invacuation/lockdown implementation using predetermined protocols/alarms/code words (but NOT fire alarm for evacuation). REMEMBER that attackers may hear any instructions given on PA system or Radios (such as location of protected spaces).
- ✔ To worshippers - use pre-scripted clear and concise messages to provide instructions about where to go and what to do. REMEMBER that an evacuation may need to be followed by a dispersal rather than an assembly.

- ✔ To neighbours - so they can take action to keep themselves and other safe in accordance with their own emergency plans and procedures.
- ✔ To emergency services - keep them regularly updated on developments and relevant new information while they are on their way, so they are prepared with the best understanding of the situation (keep updating the key information using ETHANE reports).
- ✔ By delegating clearly specified tasks and messages to nominated/trained staff such as communications with emergency services, neighbours, making the pre-scripted public announcements etc.

### **1.5. REVIEW the situation**

- ✔ By actively monitoring and understanding the developing situation and the activities of staff who are implementing the emergency procedures.
- ✔ By making further/updated assessments based on any new/changing information.
- ✔ By sharing information with the emergency services (using updated ETHANE reports) and receiving any new/updated guidance or instructions from them.
- ✔ By developing and implementing the best possible actions/response(s) by confirming/adapting decisions and by making new ones based on the changing situation and advice of the emergency services.
- ✔ By clear, concise and timely communications with staff, worshippers and neighbours.

### **1.6. MAINTAIN a record**

- ✔ Of information received and requested for building and maintaining the situation awareness (including timings, who requested/provided).
- ✔ Of decisions made (including timings) and the supporting reasons (what options were considered, the rationale for rejecting/accepting specific options).
- ✔ Of significant communications that were made (to who, including timings).

**The incident manager will need to rely on the following capabilities as the basis for implementing an effective response to terrorist/extremist threats or attacks:**

### **1.7. Personal Training**

Personal training for their role and responsibilities, including opportunities to rehearse and exercise them.

#### **A Plan**

Setting out tactical options for responding to a terrorist/extremist threat or attack; with reference to the specific threat context and vulnerabilities of the place of worship/event.

**A Location**

A preferred secure location known to staff for carrying out incident management functions with sufficient security, access to communications, resources, CCTV, copies of plans and contact lists. Back-up options should also be identified in case the preferred location is compromised by the incident. The emergency services should also know where to find/consult the incident manager and take over responsibility for incident management from them as soon as possible after arriving at the scene.

**Relevant emergency procedures**

Designed specifically for the characteristics of the site/event.

**Staff/Teams**

The human capacity for implementing the tactical options and emergency procedures; they must be familiar with the plans/options/procedures and have been trained/exercised in them - particularly evacuation (including non-fire), invacuation and lockdown; this should include nominated staff/roles for leading and implementing specific procedures. Individuals from the religious or administrative staff and volunteers can be included. The role of the incident manager is a critical function, and they should always have a nominated deputy available to take over their role (maintained competency/training, updated call out lists etc.).

**Communications**

Tested and reliable communications capabilities for giving/ receiving/exchanging information/decisions with staff; to announce information and instructions to worshippers; contact lists for emergency situations (internal and external); nominated staff/teams for delegation of communications tasks.



## 2. GUIDE for interoperability with the emergency services

**Advance consultation and joint planning/plans between the emergency services and the place of worship is good practice to ensure a timely and effective response by the emergency services and place of worship in case a terrorist/extremist threat or attack was to ever occur.**

The best pre-determined options and locations for emergency activities should be selected, agreed and included in plans held by the emergency services and the place of worship (including the operator/managing body of the site), examples include:

- Forward command post(s) - for a representative from the place of worship to attend and provide cooperation, support and coordination of the response.
- Rendezvous Point(s) for emergency services - for their resources to assemble close to the scene and for briefings of their staff so they can be deployed.
- Triage and treatment areas - for emergency medical services to establish their medical responses for processing casualties and transport them to medical facilities for further treatment if necessary.
- Mass decontamination area(s) - for large scale decontamination of people if needed as a result of a CBRN incident/attack.
- Traffic Management plan(s) - to ensure speed of access to the site/event for emergency vehicles and implementation of road blocks/diversions to keep people and traffic safely away from the area, to deal with potential points of congestion that may impede their response and ensuring ambulances can leave the area to transport casualties to hospital.

### The place of worship should:

- ✓ **Design** specific emergency procedures to complement and facilitate the emergency services' response plans into their own plans (such as closing car parks so people leaving in their vehicles will not block emergency service access and/or surrounding road networks).
- ✓ **Share** their emergency plans and procedures with the emergency services so evacuation/invacuation/lockdown plans and routes are known together with any designated protected/refuge areas where worshippers may be directed to shelter.
- ✓ **Plan** where and how they will hand-over incident management responsibility to the emergency services as soon as possible after they arrive at the scene and provide ongoing support to them by coordinating the response of the place of worship (consider access to CCTV, public and staff communications etc).
- ✓ **Agree** a procedure for reversing lockdown and the release of people from protected/refuge areas so emergency services have a predetermined and structured approach to this aspect of their intervention and the rescue of worshippers who are sheltering inside the place of worship (and staff at the place of worship can be trained accordingly).
- ✓ **Exercise** their plans and procedures with the emergency services to test and validate them, which can also provide an opportunity for staff training and rehearsal and mutual learning that can lead to improvements to plans, procedures, cooperation and interoperability.

### 3. GUIDE for developing a Welcome Team

**In keeping with the open and welcoming ethos and culture of places of worship, it is recommended that 'Welcome Teams' are formed to receive worshippers and visitors at large gatherings and events who are trained and exercised in security and emergency procedures to provide an increased and improved capability for the place of worship in detecting, deterring and delaying general security threats - including terrorist/extremist threats and attacks.**

Welcome Teams can be developed at places of worship as a primary means of delivering some security capability where no formal security staff (or team) are deployed. A Welcome Team may also be developed to supplement and reinforce existing security staff/team capabilities. Some places of worship may be able to develop existing teams of non-security staff (and/or volunteers) based on the Welcome Team principles.

#### 3.1. Role of the Welcoming Team

There are two primary roles which can be adapted according to the individual preferences and requirements of the place of worship:

- Welcoming worshippers and visitors and providing them with general information and support as needed/requested (such as handing out information leaflets about the event/future events, directions to parking/seating, answering questions about the venue and facilities).
- Monitoring, reporting and responding to potential security threats/risks (such as suspicious items or behaviour) and implementing emergency procedures, when necessary, in response to a potential or actual emergency (such as a credible threat from a suspicious/unattended item, a serious incident, a terrorist/extremist threat or attack).

#### 3.2. Staff and/or Volunteers

- Selection and recruitment should be linked to the dual roles of hospitality and security (such as good interpersonal and communication skills combined with good observations skills, problem-solving and confident decision-making).
- Selection and recruitment could be made from the worshipping community with the added advantage of being recognised, known, trusted and familiarised with the site as well as being personally invested in the activities/ community of the place of worship.
- Selection and recruitment could be based on previous relevant skills and experience (such as in the hospitality sector or previous service in the military/emergency services).

#### 3.3. Deployment

- The team should be clearly identifiable to worshippers and visitors by some means. This can be considered and decided by each place of worship according to their particular culture, customs and preferences and depending on how visible and noticeable they would like the team to be (such as a badge, a corporate item of clothing worn by them all, a uniform, a reflective jacket - perhaps marked as 'Welcomer' or something similar).
- The team should (ideally) be deployed at key points according to the findings of the vulnerability assessment and across all the specified phases of security – phase 1 access roads, phase 2 parking, phase 3 approach to venue, phase 4 arrival area, phase 5 access to venue (areas

without access control), phase 6 access to venue (areas with access control). This will provide a strong capability for early monitoring/recognition of a potential or actual threat/risk and for early counter measures/emergency procedures to be implemented across all the phases of site security.

- Welcomers should (ideally) be deployed in pairs. This will provide the best capability and opportunity for monitoring, assessing, responding and reporting potential or actual threats and for implementing any emergency procedures. Safe and effective systems of working could more easily be achieved in pairs (such as a staff member supported by a volunteer, one team member dealing with a suspicious item/behaviour item while the second reports it by radio, two team members to implement an emergency procedure more quickly).
- The presence of a recognisable team (ideally) across all the phases of security will deliver a visible security deterrent and provide reassurance about safety and security to worshippers and visitors.

### 3.4. Communications

- Consideration should be given to the variety of communications options that can be made available to the Welcome Team (such as personal radios, mobile phones, social media/chat groups, public announcement systems).
- Communications capacities and limitations should be fully tested and understood (such as what area(s) can/cannot hear a public announcement system broadcast, mobile phone signal viability in protected spaces). Communications capabilities should be regularly tested, exercised and maintained.
- Training in any code words used to invoke emergency procedures or indicate specific locations must be regularly conducted and reinforced to avoid any confusion if/when they are used.

### 3.5. Training

Welcome Team staff (and/or volunteers) will need to be trained in:

- Core skills (such as customer service, communication skills, problem solving and decision-making).
- Basic security awareness, particularly in the recognition, reporting and response to suspicious items and behaviour such as defensive searching of buildings, procedures for reporting incidents to the emergency services).
- Event/site plans at the place of worship to understand how events are organised and managed, how crowd movements can be managed and where critical services are resources are located.
- Implementing emergency procedures, particularly evacuation (fire and non-fire), invacuation (sheltering, hiding), CBRN (steps 123+, Remove x3) and lockdown (to include reinforcement and validation by using role play, rehearsals and exercises).

## 4. ADVICE for the public to stay safe during a terrorist/extremist attack



### RUN

- Escape if you can
- Consider the safest options
- Is there a safe route? RUN, if not HIDE.
- Can you get there without exposing yourself to greater danger?
- Help other people to escape, but don't let their indecision slow you down
- Leave belongings behind
- Do not attempt to film the incident – run
- Alert people around you and deter them from entering danger zone



### HIDE

- If you cannot run, HIDE
- Find cover from gunfire e.g., substantial brickwork / heavy reinforced walls
- If you can see the attacker, they may be able to see you. Cover from view does not mean you are safe. Bullets go through glass, brick, wood and metal.
- You must still hide, even if you are behind a locked door.
- Be aware of your exits
- Try not to get trapped
- Turn off light and mute the devices
- Be quiet, silence your phone and turn off vibrate
- Lock / barricade yourself in and move away from the door



## TELL

If you cannot speak or make a noise, listen to the instructions given to you by the call taker:

- Call 112 - If you cannot speak or make a noise, listen to the instructions given to you by the call taker
- What do the police need to know?
  - Nature of the Incident – What is happening?
  - Location – where is the incident taking place? Give an address or general location
  - Suspects – Where are the suspects?
  - Direction – Where did you last see the suspects?
  - Descriptions – Describe the attacker, numbers, features, clothing, weapons etc.
  - Further information – Casualties, type of injury, building information, entrances, exits, hostages etc
- Follow police instructions
- Remain calm
- Avoid sudden movements that may be considered a threat
- Keep your hands open and in view



## POLICE MAY

- Point guns at you
- Treat you firmly
- Question you
- Be unable to distinguish you from the attacker
- Officers will evacuate you when it is safe to do so

## 5. ADVICE for the public to stay safe during a CBRN incident

- REMOVE yourself from the area and get away from anything that may be dangerous like:
  - unusual smells
  - unexplained vapor or mist clouds
  - dead or unwell people or animals
  - oily droplets or films on surfaces or water
  - unusual materials or equipment
- Choose perpendicular way to the wind direction
- Even if you feel unwell, DON'T sit or lie down, you might not be able to get up again
- If inside, try to go outside into fresh air if possible
- If you see people who are unwell or passing out, help them leave the area without retracing your steps
- As soon as you get to a safer area, carefully REMOVE your outer clothing – it may be contaminated:
  - DON'T touch the outside surface of the clothing with your hands
  - DON'T let the outside surface make contact with your face when you take off clothing
  - IF POSSIBLE try to isolate clothing in a plastic bag – like a garbage bag - or leave them on the ground and keep away. Tell emergency responders where they are when they arrive to help
  - IF POSSIBLE, REMOVE any hazardous substance from your skin using a dry absorbent material to soak it up or brush it off. RINSE continually with water if the skin is itchy or painful
- Use your mobile phone to alert the emergency services on 112 about:
  - The location of the incident
  - Your location (if different)
  - That hazardous materials might be involved
- WAIT for emergency services and follow their instructions
- DON'T go home because you may contaminate your family
- DON'T visit a medical facility, you may contaminate other people and emergency workers
- The emergency services will organize a place nearby where you can receive medical treatment
- DON'T touch anyone
- DON'T touch your face
- DON'T drink, eat or smoke

## 6. ACTIONS to take IMMEDIATELY following a CBRN incident

**These actions can significantly improve the outcome for everyone**

### ✓ RECOGNISE - THE INDICATORS OF A CBRN ATTACK

Any one of these may be indicators of a CBRN incident & multiple indicators may increase the likelihood that it is CBRN-related

#### **Physical symptoms:**

- Disorientation and sweating
- Twitching and convulsions
- Airway irritation and breathing difficulties
- Eye and skin irritation
- Nausea and vomiting

#### **Signs – two or more people incapacitated for no explainable reason:**

- Unexplained liquids, powders or vapours
- Unexplained smells or tastes
- Unusual and/ or unattended materials, devices or equipment
- Dead insects, animals or withered plants

### ✓ ASSESS - THE INCIDENT TO INFORM AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE STRATEGY

#### **Stay safe - do not put yourself or others in danger to assess the incident**

- Where are CBRN indicators present?
  - To avoid moving people on the site through affected routes.
- Where are **casualties** located?
  - To identify who is exposed and advise Emergency Services.
- Where are other people on the site located?
  - To identify who isn't exposed and nearby routes for evacuation.
- Which routes are unaffected?
  - To identify unaffected routes for evacuation of people on the site.

- Are there any obvious secondary threats?
  - To reduce the risk of a further non-CBR attack.

**If there are significant external hazards consider moving people to a safer area upwind or inside if possible.**

✔ REACT - APPROPRIATELY TO REDUCE THE HARM TO EVERYONE

**Communicate:**

- With emergency services as soon as possible, and say what you see

**REMOVE, REMOVE, REMOVE message to all those affected (Figure No. 4)**

- With people on the site to move them to an unaffected location via unaffected routes

**Act:**

- To prevent **all but essential** access to **affected** locations
- To keep potentially exposed individuals in an unaffected location, separate from those unexposed
- On planned processes to modify **building functions** e.g., lifts and aircon systems if appropriate

**Important:**

Stay safe - do not put yourself or others in danger to assess the incident.



**Figure 4 – Remove, Remove, Remove**

**TELL THOSE AFFECTED TO:**



**REMOVE THEMSELVES...**  
...from the immediate area to avoid further exposure to the substance. Fresh air is important.  
**If the skin is itchy or painful, find a water source.**



**REMOVE OUTER CLOTHING...**  
...if affected by the substance.  
Try to avoid pulling clothing over the head if possible.  
Do not smoke, eat or drink.  
**Do not pull off clothing stuck to skin.**



**REMOVE THE SUBSTANCE...**  
...from skin using a dry absorbent material to either soak it up or brush it off.  
**RINSE continually with water if the skin is itchy or painful.**

Source: UK National Counter Terrorism Security Office, UK (2018) - <https://www.protectuk.police.uk/advice-and-guidance/response/remove-remove-remove-guidance-hazardous-substance-exposure>

## 7. OPTIONS for the emergency response to a terrorist/extremist threat or attack

All the options should be implemented in accordance with any national laws and respect any regional or local regulations or conditions which may be different among Member States.

### 7.1. No action required

**When the threat is considered implausible and it is reasonable and proportionate, after evaluation not to evacuate or invacuate** (such as a hoax). Police may provide additional advice and guidance about other risk management options. Staff familiar with the site could be asked to check their immediate surroundings to identify anything out of place, making them aware of what to look for and considering that a 'hoax' may have been a test of your response as part of a hostile reconnaissance operation.

### 7.2. Full Evacuation

**When reasonable to assume the attack or threat is credible, and when evacuation will move people towards a place of greater safety.** Direct everyone to 'evacuate to their nearest exit' and disperse or direct them to specific exits. In some cases, this may be requested/directed by police.

### 7.3. Partial / Phased / Zonal Evacuation

**When priority is given to the people closest to, or most at risk from the threat who are evacuated before others.** Reduces overloading of internal or external circulation routes when evacuating large numbers of people. Direct each group/zone to 'evacuate to their nearest exit' and disperse or direct them to specific exits.

### 7.4. Directional Evacuation

**When a specific area is, or is likely to become dangerous, or an alternative route would cause people to pass through (or near) the area of threat.** Direct people to 'evacuate to a SPECIFIED exit' and disperse. This may increase overall evacuation time but could improve safety

### 7.5. Invacuation

**When it is safer to move people away from the threat while remaining inside the venue.** If the threat is outside, or the location is unknown, it can be more dangerous to evacuate if the route takes them past, or closer, to the threat (such as a suspect device, contaminated environment or an ongoing external attack) and may expose them to greater danger (such as death or injuries from blast fragments and glass). Moving people inside the venue is often safer than evacuating them to the outside; especially if they can be directed to pre-identified safer/protected spaces. Direct people to move quickly to SPECIFIED PLACES and AVOID naming the specified places on any public address system in case attackers overhear the location(s). Rely on staff who have been trained and practised in the invacuation procedure to direct people and lead them to the safer/protected spaces.

## 7.6. Full Lockdown

**When preventing an attack has not been possible, and the entry of the threat/attacker(s) could make those inside more vulnerable.** The ability to frustrate and delay the attacker(s) and reduce the number of potential casualties may be greatly increased by a complete lockdown of the site; especially for keeping the threat/attacker(s) outside. This could lead to people being 'locked outside' and more vulnerable to the threat; each case must be assessed on the information known. Good internal and external information and communications systems will be necessary to quickly activate the implementation of the full lockdown by staff and inform people to 'stay inside' and to be ready to follow any further instructions of the staff (in anticipation that movement to a safer/protected space may follow).

## 7.7. Partial / Phased / Zonal Lockdown

**When preventing an attack has not been possible, and the threat/attackers have (or are) entering and putting those inside at risk.** The ability to frustrate and delay the attacker(s) and reduce the number of potential casualties may be greatly increased through a partial, phased or zonal lockdown of the site; especially during the entry phase of an attack. This may be a more localised and targeted lockdown closest to the threat; and/or closest to large groups that can be quickly protected; and or key points that can substantially delay and frustrate the progress of the attacker(s) (such as stairwells). This may be more easily and quickly achieved than a full lockdown. The purpose of delaying an attacker is to either make it more difficult for them to reach their target, thus protecting people and property, or to slow down their escape from a scene and raise the chance of their apprehension by the authorities. Staff can progressively and dynamically develop and extend the lockdown according to the nature of the threat/attack and their own capabilities to implement the measures. Good internal and external information and communications systems will be necessary to quickly activate the implementation of the partial/phased/zonal lockdown by staff. Inform people to 'stay inside' and to be prepared to follow any further instructions of the staff (in anticipation that movement to a safer/protected space may follow).

## 8. GUIDE for evacuation planning

**Implementing a full, partial or zonal evacuation in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or fast-moving incident such as an explosive, firearms or weapons attack is very challenging and can only be effective if adequate planning, training and rehearsal have been undertaken.**

**The following principles should be applied and adapted to the particular design, layout and infrastructure of the place of worship or event:**

- Recognise that an evacuation in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or attack will need to be different to a fire evacuation (DON'T use certain fire exits close to the threat/attack, disperse DON'T assemble, DON'T use fire alarm, a DIFFERENT emergency evacuation plan for staff/volunteers/worshippers with disabilities etc).
- Identify how the site can be zoned so partial/phased/zonal evacuations can be controlled and prioritised to minimise the overloading of internal or external circulation routes.
- Consider the suitability, capacities and limitations of exit routes (such as trip hazards, lighting, 'pinch-points' etc.) and ensure they are regularly reviewed.
- Consider using 'improvised' methods and points of exit during a terrorist/extremist attack (such as ground floor windows to a safe outside area if an attacker has entered the building).
- Consider that the safety of particular routes may change during the course of an attack. For example, the use of lifts (in non-fire scenarios) may reduce evacuation times, but send people to an area where attackers may be located.
- Different routes and the names of the exits should be clearly labelled and familiarised to staff.
- Evacuation procedures should also put adequate steps in place to ensure no one else can enter the area once an evacuation has been initiated.
- For CBRN incidents, consider evacuating uphill and upwind, staying away from the building heating and ventilation systems if the incident occurred inside the building.
- In an emergency evacuation during an attack, it is possible that staff and worshippers may be directly and unavoidably confronted by an attacker. As a very last resort when there is a life-threatening situation, an attempt could be made to disrupt/delay and/or incapacitate the attacker by:
  - Acting as aggressively as possible against them
  - Throwing items at them
  - Improvising weapons from anything available that can be used to counter, disarm, immobilise them (such as scissors, hot liquids) or to keep them away from your personal space if they have a sharp object (broom, pole).
  - Working together with others in a team effort to overwhelm and incapacitate them
- Procedures need to be flexible enough to cope with and complement lockdown, invacuation and movement to safer/protected spaces.
- Include staff/volunteer roles and responsibilities and train/rehearse staff in the procedures.

**Communication:**

- DO NOT activate the fire alarm to initiate an evacuation; this can initiate an inappropriate response that may expose people to danger.
- Public announcement systems, if available, may provide more flexibility to provide information and instructions appropriate to the situation and confirm to staff/volunteers/worshippers that the emergency is real and reduce a potential delay in response.
- Direct people towards a place of greater safety informing them to 'evacuate to their nearest exit' and then to disperse, or direct them to specific exits e.g. Blue exit on 1st floor.
- Pre-scripted messages can be developed. Consideration should also be given to different target audiences (such as children, wheelchair users etc.)
- Communication without alerting attackers is important, so the use of code words (on public announcement systems or radios) would need to be included in planning, training and exercising.
- Ensure adequate communications are in place, particularly within and between protected spaces to:
  - Check that staff/volunteers can be accounted for
  - Communicate with the emergency/security team(s)
  - Communicate the status of the incident to staff/volunteers
  - Control movement of staff within or out of the protected space
  - Declare when the incident is over and it is safe to leave protected spaces/reverse any lockdown
- Ensure that staff/volunteers know their roles and remain contactable throughout the incident and understand procedures for contacting the emergency services. If evacuated people (and staff) disperse, ensure an adequate procedure for contacting and accounting for all staff afterwards.

## 9. GUIDE for invacuation planning

**Implementing a full, partial or zonal invacuation in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or fast-moving incident such as an explosive, firearms or weapons attack is very challenging and can only be effective if adequate planning, training and rehearsal have been undertaken.**

**The following principles should be applied and adapted to the particular design, layout and infrastructure of the place of worship or event:**

- There are occasions when it may be safer to move people away from the threat while remaining inside.
- If the threat is outside your venue, or the location is unknown, people may be exposed to greater danger if the evacuation route takes them past the threat (such as a suspect device, contaminated environment or an ongoing external attack).
- Glass and other fragments from IEDs may kill or injure at a considerable distance, moving people inside (including to protected spaces) is often safer than evacuating them to an outside area or onto the streets.
- Identify any 'safe room(s)' which have been specifically designed and constructed for sheltering people from an attack within your building(s) and include them in your emergency plans. Ensure they are properly maintained and stocked with essential supplies and understand the maximum sheltering capacity (and time) they can provide.
- Develop 'protected spaces' within your building(s) to more securely protect people and include them in your emergency plans. 'Protected spaces' can be used in the absence of purpose built 'safe rooms' or to supplement their sheltering capacity according to the anticipated needs of the place of worship. Protected spaces should:
  - Be located in areas surrounded by full-height masonry walls, e.g. internal corridors, toilet areas or large rooms with doors opening inwards
  - Be located away from windows and external walls
  - Be located away from the area between the building's perimeter and the first line of supporting columns (known as the 'perimeter structural bay')
  - Be located away from stairwells or areas with access to lift shafts which open at ground level onto the street (because if compromised, blast could travel up them. However, if the stair and lift cores are entirely enclosed, they could make good protected spaces)
  - Avoid using the ground floor or first floor if possible. Basements and attic spaces may be unsuitable in the case of a CBRN threat or attack.
  - Provide one or more areas with enough space to contain the anticipated number of occupants
  - Provide sufficient air, toilet facilities, seating, drinking water, lighting and communications (because they may be necessary to accommodate people for an extended period of a few hours or more). The ability to shut down any mechanical ventilation systems may be necessary in the case of a CBRN threat or attack to prevent contamination of the protected area.
  - Be consulted with a structural engineer who has knowledge of explosive, CBRN and ballistic effects

- Consider staff training and exercising in techniques for improvising/strengthening a safer area (or hiding places) by making effective barricades, using door wedges, remaining silent, instructing phones are switched to silent/non-vibrate, turning out lights, covering windows etc.
- In an emergency invacuation during an attack, it is possible that staff and worshippers may be directly and unavoidably confronted by an attacker. As a very last resort when there is a life-threatening situation, an attempt could be made to disrupt/delay and/or incapacitate the attacker by:
  - Acting as aggressively as possible against them
  - Throwing items at them
  - Improvising weapons from anything available that can be used to counter, disarm or immobilise them (such as scissors, hot liquids, furniture)
  - Working together with others in a team effort to overwhelm and incapacitate them
- Procedures need to be flexible enough to cope with and complement lockdown, invacuation and movement to safer/protected spaces.
- Include staff/volunteer roles and responsibilities and train/rehearse staff in the procedures.

#### **Communications:**

- Any invacuation will need to be supported by a communication giving clear and concise instructions. When crafting communications, consider both the effectiveness on staff but also how this may be received (and acted upon) by attackers. The crafting of these messages requires considerable thought and practice in delivery.
- Pre-scripted messages can be developed. Consideration should also be given to different target audiences (such as children, wheelchair users etc.).
- Communications systems could include internal public announcement systems, handheld radios or other stand-alone systems. Do not rely on mobile phones as they may not receive a signal in a protected space (this should be carefully tested).
- Ensure that staff/volunteers know their roles and remain contactable during the incident and understand procedures for contacting the emergency services.
- Ensure adequate communications are in place, particularly within and between protected spaces to:
  - Check that staff/volunteers can be accounted for
  - Communicate with the emergency/security team(s)
  - Communicate the status of the incident to staff/volunteers
  - Control movement of staff within or out of the protected space
  - Declare when the incident is over and it is safe to leave protected spaces/reverse any lockdown
- A procedure and codeword may need to be used to announce it is safe to leave a protected space so a hostage or staff member cannot be forced under duress to entice and 'trick' people out of a protected space or to open the door so the attacker(s) can enter.

## 10. GUIDE for lockdown planning

**Implementing a full, partial or zonal lockdown in response to a terrorist/extremist threat or fast-moving incident such as an explosive, firearms or weapons attack is very challenging and can only be effective if adequate planning, training and rehearsal have been undertaken.**

**The following principles should be applied and adapted to the particular design, layout and infrastructure of the place of worship or event:**

- Identify all access and exit points within both the public and private areas of the site. Access points may be more than just doors and gates.
- Identify how to quickly and physically secure access/exit points. Consider both the design of the locking device at these points and whose role it would be to secure them eg. key or manually operated, automatically/remotely controlled etc.
- Identify how lockdown can be quickly reversed if needed (such as in the case of a fire, an attacker breaking in, or CBRN contamination).
- Identify how to disable lifts without returning them to the ground floor.
- Identify how to stop people leaving or entering the site, and how people can be directed away from danger.
- Identify how your site can be zoned to allow specific areas to be locked down.
- In an emergency lockdown during an attack, it is possible that staff and worshippers may be directly and unavoidably confronted by an attacker. As a very last resort when there is a life-threatening situation, an attempt could be made to disrupt/delay and/or incapacitate the attacker by:
  - Acting as aggressively as possible against them
  - Throwing items at them
  - Improvising weapons from anything available that can be used to counter, disarm or immobilise them (such as scissors, hot liquids, furniture)
  - Working together with others in a team effort to overwhelm and incapacitate them
- Processes need to be flexible enough to cope with and complement evacuation, invacuation and movement to protected spaces.
- Include staff/volunteer roles and responsibilities and train/rehearse staff in the procedures.

### **Communications:**

- Any lockdown will need to be supported by a communication giving clear and concise instructions. When crafting communications, consider both the effectiveness on staff but also how this may be received (and acted upon) by attackers. The crafting of these messages requires considerable thought and practice in delivery.
- Pre-scripted messages can be developed. Consideration should also be given to different target audiences (such as children, wheelchair users etc.)



- Communications systems could include internal public announcement systems, handheld radios or other stand-alone systems. Do not rely on mobile phones as they may not receive a signal in a protected space (this should be carefully tested).
- Ensure that staff/volunteers know their roles and remain contactable during the incident and understand procedures for contacting the emergency services.
- Ensure adequate communications within and between protected spaces to:
  - Check that staff/volunteers can be accounted for
  - Communicate with the emergency/security team(s)
  - Communicate the status of the incident to staff/volunteers
  - Control movement of staff within or out of the protected space
  - Declare when the incident is over and it is safe to leave protected spaces/reverse any lockdown
- A procedure and codeword may need to be used to announce it is safe to end the lockdown or leave a protected space so a hostage or staff member cannot be forced under duress to entice and 'trick' people to open a door so the attacker(s) can enter or to leave the protected space.

## 11. ACTIONS to take when a suspicious item of mail, package, substance is discovered

- LEAVE IT WHERE IT WAS FOUND - DO NOT TOUCH OR DISTURB IT - DO NOT CLEAN UP ANY SUBSTANCE
- CLEAR THE IMMEDIATE AREA of all people and keep others away
- INSTRUCT PEOPLE in the immediate area to WASH HANDS AND ANY EXPOSED SKIN with soap and water and tell them to wait for further instructions
- SHUT DOWN ALL EQUIPMENT in the immediate area used for heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVACs)
- CORDON OFF THE IMMEDIATE AREA to keep people out and DIRECT PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE HAZARD
- RECORD IMPORTANT INFORMATION about the package, substance or mail item
- DO NOT USE MOBILE PHONES OR RADIOS in the cleared area or within fifteen metres of the package

**EXACT LOCATION** of suspicious package, substance or item of mail:

.....  
.....  
.....

**DESCRIPTION** of suspicious package, substance or item of mail:

.....  
.....  
.....

**RECORD** of any markings, labels or declarations on the suspicious package or item of mail:

.....  
.....  
.....

**ADDRESSEE** name and address:

.....  
.....  
.....

**SENDER** name and address:

.....  
.....  
.....

**NAMES** of people in the immediate area when found:

.....  
.....  
.....

- ✔ IF NOT AN IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY SITUATION - REPORT to INSERT INTERNAL PERSON/ROLE
- ✔ IN THE CASE OF AN EMERGENCY SITUATION - CALL THE EMERGENCY SERVICES 112

**Figure 5 – Suspicious letter and package<sup>1</sup>**



<sup>1</sup> <https://uwaterloo.ca/central-stores/mail-pickup-delivery/suspicious-mail>

## 12. ACTIONS to take if a bomb threat-hoax is received

- ✔️ REMAIN CALM AND TALK TO THE CALLER:
  - **DO NOT** put them on hold or cut them off
  - **ALERT SOMEONE** as quickly as possible
  - **OBTAIN** as much information as you can
  - **KEEP THE CALLER TALKING** (apologise for bad line, ask the caller to speak up, etc.)
  - **COMPLETE THIS FORM** during the call by asking the questions in sequence if necessary
  - **KEEP TELEPHONE LINE OPEN** even after the caller has disengaged as it might be traceable with technology
- ✔️ RECORD THE CALL IF YOU CAN
- ✔️ NOTE THE CALLER'S NUMBER IF DISPLAYED ON YOUR PHONE:  
(for cases of social media or e-mail threat see below)
- ✔️ WRITE THE EXACT WORDING OF THE THREAT:
  - When?
  - Where?
  - What?
  - How?
  - Who?
  - Why?
  - Time?

Notes...

- ✔️ ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND RECORD THE ANSWERS AS ACURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

1. Where exactly is the bomb right now?

.....  
.....

2. When is it going to explode?

.....  
.....

3. What does it look like?

.....  
.....

4. What does the bomb contain?

.....  
.....

5. How will it be detonated?

.....  
.....

6. Did you place the bomb? If not you, who did?

.....  
.....

7. What is your name?

.....  
.....

8. What is your address?

.....  
.....

9. What is your telephone number?

.....  
.....

10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?

.....  
.....

11. Why have you placed the bomb?

.....  
.....

✔ IN CASES OF SOCIAL MEDIA OR E-MAIL BOMB THREATS:

- **DO NOT** reply to, forward or delete the message
- If sent via email note the address

- If sent via social media what application has been used and note the username/ID
- Preserve all web log files for your organisations to help the police investigation (as a guide, 7 days prior to the threat message and 48 hours after)

✔ IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE BUILDING / SECURITY MANAGER SO THEY CAN REPORT THE BOMB THREAT TO THE POLICE AND DECIDE WHAT OTHER ACTION TO TAKE:

- Name of person informed:

.....  
.....

- Time informed:

.....  
.....

**NOTES TO BE COMPLETED BY THE CALL-TAKER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER REPORTING THE BOMB THREAT**

**THE CALLER**

Male	Female	Unsure	Age	Nationality

**CALLER'S VOICE**

Calm	Angry	Crying	Slow	Accent

Stutter	Lisp	Slurred	Disguised	If familiar, who did it sound like?

Deep	Laughter	Hoarse	Nasal

**THREAT LANGUAGE**

Aggressive	Taped	Incoherent	Irrational

**BACKGROUND NOISE (DESCRIBE)**

Street	House	Animal	Music	Other

Clear	Voice(s) machine PA system	Other noise, describe

Children	Aircraft

**ANYTHING ELSE – UNUSUAL**

**ANYTHING ELSE – SIGNIFICANT**

--	--

**CALL DETAILS**

Date of call		Time of call	
Time call ended		Phone number / extension of receiving	
Location where call was received		Details of any other witnesses to the call	

## 13. ACTIONS to take when a suspicious item is discovered

### ✔ **CONFIRM:** if it has recognisable suspicious characteristics **USE 'HOT' ASSESSMENT**

**IS IT HIDDEN?** Yes / No

**IS IT OBVIOUSLY SUSPICIOUS?** Yes / No

Has the item been deliberately concealed or is it obviously hidden from view? Yes / No

Does it have wires, circuit boards, batteries, tape, liquids or putty-like substances visible? Yes / No

Do you think the item poses an immediate threat to life? Yes / No

**IS IT TYPICAL?** ...of what you would expect to find in this location Yes / No

Most lost property is found where people congregate, ask if anyone has left the item.

**If the item is assessed to be unattended rather than suspicious, examine it further before using the lost property procedure BUT if the 'HOT' assessment leads you to believe the item is suspicious you should...**

### ✔ **CLEAR: THE IMMEDIATE AREA**

- Do not touch it
- Take charge and move people away to a safe distance. Even for a small item such as a briefcase move at least 100m away from the item starting from the centre and moving out (emergency may recommend at least 200m distance for a car sized explosive threat and 400m for a truck sized explosive threat).
- Keep yourself and other people out of line of sight of the item. It is a broad rule, but generally if you cannot see the item then you are better protected from it
- Think about what you can hide behind. Pick something substantial and keep away from glass such as windows and skylights
- Cordon off the area



✔ **COMMUNICATE: CALL THE EMERGENCY SERVICES**

- Inform (INSERT NAME/INTERNAL ROLE OF PERSON IN CHARGE)
- Do not use mobile phones or radios within fifteen metres of the suspicious item

✔ **CONTROL: ACCESS TO CORDONED AREA**

- The public should not be able to approach the area until it is considered safe
- Try and keep eyewitnesses nearby so they can tell the emergency services what they saw try to get contact details before witnesses move away

## 14. CHECKING your venue for suspicious items

### Search Considerations

Regular searches of your place of worship will enhance a good security culture and reduce the risk of a suspicious item being placed or remaining unnoticed for long periods. Additionally, if you receive a threat and depending upon how credible it is, you may decide to conduct a 'search' for suspicious items. In such cases:

- ✔ **Ensure plans are in place** to carry out an effective search in response to a threat
- ✔ **Identify who in your venue** will coordinate and take responsibility for conducting searches
- ✔ **Initiate a search** by messaging over a public address system (using a coded messages avoids unnecessary disruption and alarm), by text message, personal radio or by a telephone cascade
- ✔ **Divide your venue** into areas of a manageable size for 1 or 2 searchers. Ideally staff should follow a search plan and search in pairs to ensure nothing is missed
- ✔ **Ensure those conducting** searches are familiar with their areas of responsibility. Those who regularly work in an area are best placed to spot unusual or suspicious items
- ✔ **Focus on areas that are open to the public;** enclosed areas (e.g. cloakrooms, stairs, corridors, lifts etc.) evacuation routes and assembly points, car parks, other external areas such as loading bays
- ✔ **Develop appropriate techniques for staff** to be able to routinely search public areas without alarming any visitors present. If more specialised techniques are considered (such as bag searches on entry) then specialised training, equipment and policies may be needed (such as what items should not be allowed inside the place of worship).
- ✔ **Ensure all visitors know** who to report a suspicious item to and have the confidence to report any suspicious behaviour.

#### Important:

Do not touch or move anything assessed as a suspicious item  
– immediately start evacuation and dial 112.

## Conclusions

This document provides a set of fourteen procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the consequences of terrorist/extremist attacks at places of worship and large religious gatherings and protect the relevant stakeholders during an emergency situation. The procedures have been designed and developed with the principles of simplicity, trainability, transferability and scalability in mind so they can be implemented by staff at a large religious gathering or place of worship who may not be trained 'security professionals' but may have responsibility for managing the emergency response to an incident, threat or attack; including religious leaders that may be leading/officiating at the place of worship or event.

All the procedures should be considered in the context of national laws and respect any regional or local regulations or conditions which may be different among Member States and also take into account the capabilities and guidance from relevant public services, especially law enforcement agencies.

The effective implementation of the procedures will be highly dependent on the following factors:

- Adequate training for staff
- Awareness among worshippers
- Regular drills, rehearsals and exercises involving the procedures
- Cooperation with public services and key stakeholders
- Joint planning and interoperability with law enforcement agencies

The ProSPeReS project will provide relevant support for implementing the set of procedures by providing:

- A Manual for Vulnerability Assessment (Deliverable 2.1)
- A Guidebook, including recommendations of procedures, equipment and templates to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of the terrorist attack (Deliverable 3.3)
- A Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites (Deliverable 3.2)
- An Introduction to CBRN Threats, including security measures, scenarios and response option recommendations (Deliverables 4.1 & 4.2)
- A Training Curriculum, including trainer and trainee booklets and a virtual reality training platform (Deliverables 5.1-4)
- A Security Awareness Training Programme, including brochures, leaflets, videos and on-line materials (Deliverable 7.1-4)



[prosperes.eu](http://prosperes.eu)



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