ProSPeReS

The protocols for communication and cooperation with public services

Appendix 3

of GUIDEBOOK on security measures
for religious sites & communities

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Faith-based organizations

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Lead Beneficiary/Author(s)	SGSP (Wiktor Gawroński, Marcin Smolarkiewicz, Tomasz Zwęgliński, Łukasz Faralisz)
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No	Partner organization name	Short Name	Country
1	UNIVERSITY OF LODZ	UL	PL
2	DYNAMIC SAFETY CORPORATION	DSC	PL
3	INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE	ISEMI	SK
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Definitions

Terms	Description
CBRN-E	*Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (substances and agents)*
CCTV	*Close Circuit Television*
EU	*European Union*
FAA	*Firearms Attack*
IED	*Improvised Explosive Device*
LEA	*Law Enforcement Agency*
PBIED	*Person- Borne Improvised Explosive Device*
ProSPeReS	*Protection System for large gatherings of People in Religious Sites*
PW	*Place of Worship*
UAV	*Unmanned Aerial Vehicle*
UAVIED	*Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (borne) Improvised Explosive Device*
VBIED	*Vehicle- Borne Improvised Explosive Device*

Introduction

ISO 31000:2018 Risk Management-Guidelines defines a stakeholder as a person or an organization that can affect or be affected by an event, or who has the perception that a decision or an activity connected to event might affect him/her/it. The main stakeholders related to a potential operation at the scene of religious sites that are expected to cooperate there, these are law enforcement agencies (LEA), emergency services as well as the religious sites' authorities (administrators). Having said that the emergency services cover foremost fire brigades and emergency medical services[1].

Diverse involvement of emergency services can be envisaged depending on the nature of a religious gathering. In **the most cases of religious gatherings** both, the fire brigade and the medical services, will operate routinely. It means that they are on a standby mode located in their bases and trigger the response, if necessary, after receiving a call for response from the standard emergency number (e.g. 112 centre) that is forwarded through dedicated operational software (or if other means e.g. phone call). On the other hand, **in case of large scale religious events,** comparable to mass events, special measures are taken in advance. The following ones might be enlisted: presence of paramedics among the worshippers, first aid posts set, pre-deployment and allocation of emergency services resources in the proximity of to the event site, etc. In addition for **extraordinary gatherings**, like World Youth Days, it is common that a on-site command post as well as dedicated emergency services (e.g. fire brigade) command posts at local and higher levels HQs are established. These emergency services command posts should cooperate with LEA's command posts (e.g. via liaison officers) and other stakeholders.

The cooperation between LEA's and the religious sites' authorities might be very different as the religious gatherings themselves. There is no a standard, representative religious event or even location. The place of worship might be a single standing alone building or a complex different facilities including even multi-store buildings. Large scale religious events might be conducted as an indoor or outdoor gathering. All in all, LEAs' involvement in such events protection should be adequate to identified threats and risks potentially triggered by these threats. Based on the Polish partners (KWP Lodz, KWP Wroclaw, KSP, GWZ Warsaw) opinions in this respect collected in the course of in-depth discussions, it is fair to conclude that relatively wide spectrum of approaches might be in place as it comes to the modus-operandi of such events protection.

In case of the Roman Catholic Church there is a moderate level of cooperation between Police and religious sites. Such situation mainly concerns ordinary religious ceremonies, regardless the number of participants, even for relatively large number of people taking part. Annual Corpus Christi ceremony might be an example while the Police contribution mainly comes down to the measures related to the road safety (e.g. blocking public roads where the procession walks through). On the other hand for major, extraordinary religious events, cooperation with the Police starts already at the planning stage. In such cases a representative of the curia (catholic church body) usually is appointed in order to facilitate the process of cooperation with the Police.

A different approach is implemented by the Jewish Community of Warsaw (GWZ) which invest into regular contact with the Warsaw Police HQs. GWZ has its own internal and external armed security guards, knowing the objects (including security systems) and the specificity of the rituals. Moreover, there is a research group set up that aims at browsing the internet prior large religious events. GWZ stays constantly in touch with other Jewish Communities in the country and abroad, sharing and receiving information (also in alert mode) on potential threats and incidents that could happen or have happened to the other, above mentioned communities. There are some other examples of measures undertaken by the community in place. Among them there are daily pyrotechnic checks of objects, exercises organized by the community (incl. participation of counter-terrorism Police teams), dedicated crisis rooms (incl. the main and alternative one) as well as appointed members of a crisis team in advance. Obviously, all these aspects increase the sense of security and readiness.

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[1] PRoTECT Project (2021). D4.4 – Protection of public spaces: Manual for EU. Retrieved on May 24th, 2022. Source: https://protect-cities.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/PRoTECT_D4.4_Final_v3.00.pdf

1. Guidelines and dedicated protocols for reporting threats and updates in the case of various dangerous situations

An emergency or other dangerous situation can happened in different phase and time of the religious event. It might be in particular firearms attack, sharp object attack, vehicle attack, IED- explosives, PBIED- explosives, UAVIED- drone, VBIED- explosives, CBRN. Regardless of the type of threat, it is necessary to pass information about it to the appropriate entities as soon as possible. It is likely that in case of an emergency, many witnesses will attempt to inform the emergency services by the EU common emergency number 112 (or different local emergency numbers if exist). It does not change the fact that the organizer should stick to an emergency response plan, if one has been developed, nevertheless as a stand-alone document or a part of any other more general plan prepared due to the event. Such type of an emergency response plan should have been agreed, and ideally trained, with LEA's and emergency services in advance. Some part of the content there, should have been dedicated to description of communication means and channels through which information flow is expected to be conveyed, especially between the organizer and key stakeholders such as first responders suitable for a threat (incl. the Police, emergency medical service, fire brigade, etc.). In order to avoid delays in providing information or its incompleteness, it should be done by a designated responsible person on the side of the organizer (e.g. a priest, an imam, a rabbi, etc., or if appointed, an incident manager). This person should be known to the rest of the PW (or event) staff and should be informed about any threats or symptoms by worshipers, welcoming team or other organizer's (security) services if they have been created. In most cases, notification must follow the country's standard procedures.

In case of firearms attack, sharp object attack, vehicle attack, explosion, it is immediately clear that a threat has occurred. An ETHANE structure of report might be used to provide proper information[2]:

E – exact location;

T – type of incident;

H – hazards present or suspected;

A – access – routes that are safe to use;

N – number, type, severity of casualties;

E – emergency services present and those required.

The operator of the emergency number accepting the report uses the procedure that is enlisted below[3]:

- the exact address or location of the incident scene;

- main reason for the call (situation);

- the telephone number and personal data of the caller.

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[2] An ETHANE structured report is described in GUIDE for incident managers of terrorist/extremist threats and attacks which is the part of ProSPeReS document Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks

[3] https://www.duw.pl/czk/cpr-112/aktualnosci-112/17363,Centrum-Powiadamiania-Ratunkowego-czesto-zadawane-pytania.html; Rozporządzenie Ministra Zdrowia z dnia 19 sierpnia 2019 r. w sprawie ramowych procedur obsługi zgłoszeń alarmowych i powiadomień o zdarzeniach przez dyspozytora medycznego (Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 1703)

While providing the first responders agency with an address or location of an incident, it is relevant to inform about the best possible way of accessing the scene including potential physical obstacles. Moreover, it is to be remembered that rescue vehicles are the size of a truck.

When reporting the situation, be aware that crucial information is the characteristics of incident (what actually happened), number of injured persons or victims.

Additionally in case of firearms attack make it clear when you report the situation. Do not forget to tell how many terrorist appear, how they look like. If possible describe the firearm. Accept potential injured or victims report the number of hostages.

IED-explosives or other bomb threats (suspicious items) should always be taken seriously. Depending on the type of an incident, notifying the Police there should be following information provided:

- the content of the conversation with the caller who informed the PW about the hazard (a piece of paper and pencil during incoming call gives you opportunity to collect as many details as possible);

- the content of the sent message (e-mail);

- location and description of a localized item that may contain an explosive;

- the telephone number from which the call is being conducted and your name.

There are national procedures[4] how to behave when a bomb threat occurs. Moreover, there is also a set of procedures provided in frames of the ProSPeReS project that inform and give examples of how to deal with such extreme situations[5].

Following the procedure published by the Polish Ministry of the Interior and Administration when you receive the call:

- stay calm and don't hang up;

- if possible, signal others to listen to the telephone conversation as well;

- ask for notification of this situation to the administrator of the PW and the Police;

- note the number if the telephone handset identifies the caller number;

- write down the words of information carefully, record the conversation, if possible;

- keep the caller on the line as long as possible, use an interview form, if available, to help you collect as much information as possible (sample information from the form to collect: where is the bomb now(?), what a bomb looks like(?), which could cause an explosion(?), exact content of the statement; caller's gender; age; description of the caller voice; noise in the background);

- be available and ready to provide detailed information regarding the interview to the arriving LEA and emergency services.

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[4] For example such procedure is published by Polish Mistry of the Interior and Administration in the Internet: https://www.gov.pl/attachment/a0b0c901-675f-41bc-ae53-22647d490b0c

[5] ACTIONS to take when a suspicious item of mail, package, substance is discovered, ACTIONS to take if a bomb threat-hoax is received, ACTIONS to take when a suspicious item is discovered are the part of ProSPeReS document Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks

Administrator of the PW or incident manager is in charge of the situation until LEA arrives. In a situation where the explosive device has not yet been located, incident manager recommends that the PW staff should check:

- items that were not there before and were not brought by the PW staff;

- traces of displacement of room furnishings;

- changes in the external appearance of objects and the signals emitted from them (e.g. sounds of clock mechanisms, glowing electronic elements, etc.);

at public spaces, such as: corridors, staircases, lobbies, elevators, toilets, basements, attics, etc., and the closest external surroundings of the facility. If the PW staff find the presence of objects that were not there before or changes in the appearance and location of objects permanently present in the facility, it can be assumed that they may be explosive devices. It is forbidden to touch such objects. The information about it should be reported to LEA[6].

Characteristic of CBRN threat is described in deliverable *D4.1 Introduction to CBRN threats*. As presented there the consequences of such an event depend on many factors like: toxicity of agent, way of exposure, time of exposure, actual weather conditions and many more. In general and in most cases it will be difficult to detect and identify a release of CBRN agent in an initial stage of the incident. However, there are some indicators that might be helpful in recognizing such threats (Figure 1).

Figure 1 – Possible indicators of a CBRN incident

Indicators of possible CBRN attack

- Suspicious devices or packages (especially showing wiring, air cylinders, containers with powders or liquids)
- Oily film, powder or gel-like substance on exposed surfaces
- Unexplained, unauthorised overhead spraying in the area (from small planes or drones)
- Unexplained odours (bitter almonds, peach kernels, mown hay, cut grass)
- Cases of nausea, difficult breathing, disorientation,
- Unexplained symptoms of eyes pain, headache, non-thermal burns
- Sick or dead animals in the area
- Low-lying clouds or fog unrelated to current weather
- Unexplained clouds of dust
- Withered plants

Source: Deliverable D 4.1. Introduction to CBRN threats.

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[6] https://www.gov.pl/attachment/a0b0c901-675f-41bc-ae53-22647d490b0c

When the information about the incident is reported to an emergency number operator, it might be useful to specify:

- Why situation is suspicious?

- Is the place/building high or low profile?

- Are there any messages or intelligence about that suggest the incident?

- Who found it and when?

- Where is the threat?

- Who has had contact with suspicious material, where is that person now?

- What are local weather conditions?

- Is the threat inside the building or in an open space?

Each threat evokes emotions, therefore try to stay calm when talking to the emergency number operator. Be precise when communicating details. Remain on the phone until you receive a clear message that you can hang up. Be aware that the emergency number operator or rescue services dispatchers may want to reconnect you afterwards.

Do not hesitate to call the emergency number again if the situation on the scene changes before first responders appear on the scene. Updated information makes it possible to redirect already appointed units and alert new ones, if required by the situation.

2. A model example of cooperation at the action scene of the religious sites

As mentioned before there is no representative religious site. Large gatherings are organized inside the buildings (e.g. church, mosque), in the area of sanctuaries, but also at stadiums, roads (pilgrimages) and other open areas. Each religious organization has its own practice of organizing ceremonies, especially those that are highly symbolic or events that gather a large number of believers.

Different countries has its own legal system which defines responsibilities for law enforcement agencies (LEA) and rescue services. Therefore it is possible to define only some general assumptions of cooperation between the organizers of religious celebrations and the services responsible for responding to an emergency.

In the context of cooperation, good practices to support the protection of public spaces[7] defines to appoint contact points and clarify respective roles and responsibilities on security matters at both sides – organizer, LEA and emergency services.

The organizational structure on the part of the organizer of the religious ceremony may be limited to those who are involved in the direct conduction of the ceremony or expanded to include information, technical or security services and others (Figure 2).

Figure 2 – Religious event's stakeholders

Source: own elaboration.

Priest, imam, rabbi, pastor and other leader of a ceremony and other persons (cantor, acolyte, other) are directly involved in a ceremony conduction8. Hence technical staff of ceremony/PW ensures proper

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[7] Good practices to support the protection of public spaces, source: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/998aeb09-4be6-11e9-a8ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

[8] Priesthood in the religions of the world, Eds. W. Cisło, J. Różański, Instytut Dialogu Kultury i Religii, Wydział Teologiczny UKSW, Warszawa 2013

operation of all systems (sound system, lights, candles, etc.) necessary to conduct ceremony and also proper functioning of the facility (ventilation, access control, CCTV, etc.). Welcome team staff, that accept welcoming worshipers, should assists visitors and people with disabilities, provide information about facility, show the way. Security service provide parking lot and entrance security check, CCTV monitoring, securing the worshipers outside the facility e.g. during the procession. Intelligence service might be responsible for internet/media monitoring, contact with other religious communities and LEA's. Crisis management team gathers representatives of all groups involved in the celebration conduction and provide a service to carry out its activities when a threat occurs. Such a team cooperates with the LEA and emergency services that arrive at the scene.

It is highly important that an event plan is developed in a religious event preparation stage. Description of emergency procedures, roles and responsibilities should be there[9]. Regardless of the organizational structure of the religious event, it is necessary to appoint a person who is responsible for the safety and security of the assembly. Such an 'incident manager' should have be trained in emergency procedures and, for the purpose of better recognizable during an event, he/she should be dressed in a way that differs him/her from other organizer's staff (e.g. vest, hat).

Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and emergency services are responsible for protection of people`s health and life, protection of public safety and security as well as for an order and control of compliance with regulations concerning public life and public spaces (Figure 3).

Figure 3 – Law enforcement agencies possible roles in religious event

Source: own elaboration.

Until a threat occurs most of the tasks LEA's perform outside the religious event sites. The appearance of uniformed officers at religious gathering locations is usually reduced to the cases when there is a request from the organizer to LEAs forwarded. LEAs have the leading role in case of responding to terrorist incidents. Among the tasks of the LEAs, it is necessary to indicate: responding to firearms attack, sharp object attack, vehicle attack, IED- explosives, PBIED- explosives, UAVIED- drone, VBIED-explosives, CBRN:

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9 Facility or event security plan is one of Good practices identified which is the part of ProSPeReS document Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks

- ensuring public safety and order in the area of operations;

- designation of a safety zone;

- protection and isolation of the endangered area;

- isolation of the endangered area;

- ensuring safety and order in road traffic (in the area of the operation area);

- organizing and informing about detours to endangered areas;

- conducting negotiations;

- the use of devices that prevent third parties from telecommunications in a specific area;

- checking the facility by the Bomb response unit to reveal the explosive device;

- neutralization of explosive materials or devices;

- activities related to the disclosure of the data of the person reporting the planting of the explosive/CBRN;

- activities related to free the hostages (and unlock the facilities);

- evacuation of people;

- psychological support.

All the activities of LEAs are carried out under command of the chief of operation.

Rescue services e.g. fire brigade are formed to react in life, health or environment threatening situations. They responding in case of fires and other threats, providing chemical (haz-mat) and technical rescue, water and diving rescue, urban search & rescue, first medical aid. As part of their activities, they conduct rescue operations related to the events with CBRN factors (**Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference.**).

Figure 4 – Fire & rescue service possible roles in religious event

Source: own elaboration.

The presence of emergency services at the scene of the event before the hazard occurs is possible mainly in the form of first aid spots or patrols. Other forms of presence are also possible, if agreed at the preparation stage of the religious event. Temporary posts with proper resources (e.g. decontamination modules) might be established.

Rescue services in case of a terrorist attack are responsible for:

- recognizing and securing the scene of the event;

- recognizing and identifying the threat and forecasting its development;

- performing image recognition using advanced technical means (e.g. robots, drones, optoelectronic devices);

- designation and marking of threat zones;

- sampling;

- reaching and making access to endangered or injured people;

- evacuation of injured and endangered people and animals out of the threat zone;

- warning and alerting people about the threat and how to behave;

- carrying out measurements (chemical and radiological agents) using measuring instruments;

- limiting the effects of emission of hazardous materials;

- conducting initial decontamination of people, including rescuers;

- decontamination of equipment;

- providing qualified first aid;

- switching installations, devices and utilities on or off for rescue operations purposes;

- control of the emission of hazardous materials;

- relocating of dangerous goods;

- other tasks not directly connected to CBRN threats e.g. fire extinguishing, technical rescue (cutting, spreading, stabilizing structures and vehicles, etc.).

All the activities of emergency services at terrorist events are performed as supportive for LEAs.

Emergency medical service (EMS) is responsible for providing assistance to any person in a state of emergency by urgent pre-hospital treatment for people with serious illness and injuries. EMS provides transport to a hospital (road, air). In some countries e.g. Poland hospital emergency rooms are the part of EMS.

At the religious event sites before a terrorist threat occurs, EMS might provide first aid spots or patrols.

In case of a terrorist attack, EMS provides:

- triage;

- providing pre-hospital medical care;

- transport to a hospital (emergency room, trauma center);

- decontamination (at emergency room).

Diversity of potential threats at the action scene of religious sites cause that many types of LEAs and emergency services might be engaged in operation. In the preparatory phase there should be a matrix of roles and responsibilities[10] agreed and explained. Even if all the LEAs and emergency services are involved, the leading role depend on the type of threat. Incident manager should provide all information to the leading agency on the scene. In case of a terrorist events, LEA has the leading role.

When the threat occurs initial information should be provided to the EU emergency number (112) or directly to LEA's liaison officer by the incident manager.

If there is no emergency services on site the organizer is responsible for leading and coordinating the response during an emergency situation. The organizer should provide clear access roads for emergency services.

Incident manager with other staff should communicate worshipers directions in order to obtain the appropriate behavior (lockdown, evacuation, other), adequate to the threat. Moreover, the staff should follow the directions in the facility management (lock/open doors, switching installations, devices and utilities on or off).

When the emergency services are present on site, the incident manager should provide necessary information including facility documentation (plans of buildings, installations, etc.). In addition the incident manager should support the response by communicating and coordinating the place of worship staff.

The whole communication of organizer's staff, especially related to safety and security issues, should be known to incident manager. In case of religious events organized in large areas, it is common to use the open channel radio transmitters for the organizers communication purposes. It is a good practice, however it is not possible to use such means of communication among emergency services.

The communication channels among emergency services and also incident manager should be established. There is common understanding and practice among LEAs and rescue services how to communicate and cooperate in such situations, however it is crucial to incorporate a religious event incident manager properly into this structure.

Means and channels of communication should be established in the preparatory phase of the event. If phone connection is an agreed way of communication between the organizer and rescue services, it is important to use a separate phone number for that purpose. In a case of an emergency, the incident manager has to contact LEAs and other emergency services immediately. That's why the communication with other staff members mustn't block the dedicated phone line.

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[10] Roles and responsibilities matrix contain information: Kind of threat, risk (optionally), leading service/agency, involved services/agencies, tasks.

3. Models for cooperation and notification in large scale religious events

Coperation between the organizer of a religious event and LEA's and first responder organizations should start as soon as possible, and definitely not later than in the preparation phase to the event. The cooperation ideally should be permanent, regardless of the organization of large gathering. As it is the case then the basic level, a fundament for cooperation between PW administration and local police officer is already in place.

For the large scale religious events preparation, the cooperation usually takes place at the level of the representative of the curia and the police officer of the regional/city headquarters. The extent of LEA's involvement is expected as the preparation proceeds. Thus, it is important to appoint representatives on both sides who are responsible for communication during the preparation phase as well as during event itself.

In some cases the scope of cooperation may be limited to managing traffic and ensuring safety on the access roads to the place of the religious event by LEA's officers. Deployment of patrols results from analyzes carried out by LEA's and based on information received from the organizer on the current situation.

However, in case of a terrorist attack, the organizer should follow arrangements set at the preparation stage. If no other channels had previously been established, an emergency call must be forwarded to the emergency number. Until the time LEA's representative arrives at the scene and the situation possible change, following, updating notifications must be communicated the same way. Upon arrival of a LEA's representative, notifications should directly be made to the responding unit of LEA (not through the emergency call). As the number of LEA's officers and other resources increasing, the officer in charge might change. It is important that the representative of the religious event organizer remains in close and constant contact with the designated officer at all times.

Wider cooperation from the perspective of coordination is characterized by the constant presence of a LEA liaison officer at the religious event site. This may be the case when there is agreed to involve more LEA's resources, other difficulties or major threats are foreseen *in advance* (at the stage of preparation phase). Temporary resources allocation might be created in the vicinity of the event as well. Other arrangements, such as the presence of undercover patrols, may also be used. The representative of the organizer reports directly to LEA liaison officer in the case of a terrorist attack. An internal LEA information flow among is realized on routine basis.

The scope of cooperation mirrors the spectrum of information exchange among stakeholders. In frame of A.3.5 there has been a study conducted that focuses on the aspects of information possessed and required by the entities involved in the preparation and response during a large religious gathering. The survey was addressed to representatives of the places of worship staff, law enforcement agencies and fire & rescue units. Questions related to: 1/ preparation phase of a religious event (11 categories of information were taken into account) and, 2/ initial phase of response (with 15 categories as well).

From perspective of quantitative research methodology the results of the survey are not representative due to the number of respondents (n=28), however from the perspective of an expert study they indicate information management gaps as well as potential stakeholders who might mitigate these gaps.

Figure 5 – *Place of worship staff information possessed and necessary – planning phase*

Source: own elaboration

As Figure 5 depicts the most noticeable differences between information that is possessed vs. required by the PW staff at planning stage. These are the ones related to:

- safety and security measures (establishing an information service/ welcome team);

- buildings plans (floor plans, rooms functions, etc. - regarding places of religious worship);

- diagrams/plans of utility installations (electricity, gas, water, heating, air conditioning, etc.).

Figure 6 – LEA information possessed and necessary – planning phase

Source: own elaboration

Figure 6 shows that the two noticeable differences between information possessed and required by LEA at a planning stage are as follow:

- diagrams/plans of utility installations (electricity, gas, water, heating, air conditioning, etc.);

- evacuation procedure/ instruction, emergency response guide (for place of worship).

In other categories, the information possessed by LEA representatives exceeds their information needs what might be interpreted that for these criteria LEA is relatively satisfied with the data they usually have.

Figure 7 – Fire & rescue services information possessed and necessary – planning phase


Source: own elaboration

Figure 7 indicates information needs of fire and rescue (F&R) units. There is a deficit of information in most of the criteria. According to the fire and rescue respondents there are the only two categories that are sufficiently covered by the information flow at the stage of preparatory to a religious event. These are 1/ participants (number of participants) and, 2/ religious event scenario are at a sufficient level.

Figure 8 – Information possessed by place of worship staff vs information necessary by LEA and fire & rescue services – planning phase

Source: own elaboration

Figure 8 puts together the information needs of LEA and F&R with the information that is possessed by PW at the stage of preparation to a religious event. The graph depicts that there is a number of information gaps of the two services that might be covered by an appropriate communication flow from PW to LEA and F&R since PW is in possession of the information needed by public services. The potential information categories that are expected to be improved in communication protocols are as follow: participants (number of participants), participants (presence of VIPs), religious event scenario and safety and security measures (establishing of a security service).

Figure 9 – *Place of worship staff information possessed and necessary – initial response phase*


Source: own elaboration

Figure 9 presents a relation between PW's information needs that might appear right after an attack vs. the information the PW representatives are usually in possession at the given stage. Once the threat materializes (after attack), the biggest difference between information that is possessed vs. required by the PW staff appears to be as follow:

- number of victims/injured;

- the type of threat that has occurred;

- evacuation procedure/ instruction, emergency response guide (for place of worship).

These information categories seem to be in need of coverage by relevant communication protocols with other stakeholders at the stage of the initial response.

Figure 10 – LEA information possessed and necessary – initial response phase

Source: own elaboration

As shown at Figure 10 for initial response to a terrorist attack, LEA representatives seem to be short of most of the surveyed information categories. However, there are some exception in which LEA is satisfied with the information they have. They are as follow:

- participants (presence of VIPs);

- religious event scenario;

- safety and security measures (indicating the person responsible for cooperation with other entities);

- safety and security measures (establishing of a security service).

**Figure 11 – Fire & rescue information possessed and necessary – initial response phase**

Source: own elaboration

Figure 11 shows that in the initial response phase, F&R relatively needs more information than actually possess (similar to LEA). Nevertheless, information categories that are covered at the initial response are as follow:

- location of the incident;

- incident time;

- participants (presence of VIPs);

- religious event scenario.

Figure 12 – Information possessed by place of worship staff vs information necessary by LEA and fire & rescue services – initial response phase

Source: own elaboration

Figure 12 presents information gaps of LEA and F&R at the initial response to a terrorist attack that might be cover by relevant communication protocol with PW. Basically, PW is in a position to deliver a given information to LEA and/or F&R, since PW has this particular information (as shown on the figure). However, to do so there are to be proper communication protocols introduced into the cooperation practices. The following information categories possessed by PW might be of support for LEA and/or F&R:

- participants (presence of VIPs);

- religious event scenario;

- safety and security measures (establishing of a security service);

- safety and security measures (establishing of a medical support).

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