



GUIDEBOOK

on security measures
for religious sites & communities




This project is funded by the European Union's
Internal Security Fund – Police under Grant
Agreement No. 101034230 – ProSPeReS

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The ProSPeReS Consortium

Security experts, security research and academic institutions,
providers of technical solutions and services



Law enforcement agencies (LEAs)



Faith-based organizations



Document description

WP number and title	WP3 – Preparing tailor-made security measures for religious sites. D.3.3 – A guidebook including recommendations for procedures, equipment and templates to prevent, protect, detect, respond to and mitigate the result of a terrorist attack.
Lead Beneficiary/Author(s)	UL (Michał Stachyra, Rafał Batkowski)
Contributor(s)/Author(s)	UL, DSC, ISEMI, WSB, DISSS, HELLENBERG, CARDET, Archdiocese, Lodz, Social Obser., HMI, GWZ Warsaw, KWP Lodz, KSP, KWP Wroclaw, HELLENIC POLICE, CBK PAN, SGSP
Document type	Report
Last Update	06.03.2023 by UŁ
Dissemination level	Public / Confidential *

* Confidential – only for members of the consortium & EC Services

Acknowledgement:

This project is funded by the European Union's Internal Security Fund — Police. Grant Agreement No. 101034230 — ProSPeReS

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Abbreviations

Table 1 – Abbreviations used in the document

Acronyms / Abbreviations	Description
BWA	<i>Blade Weapon Attack</i>
CBR	<i>Chemical, Biological, Radiological (agents)</i>
CBRN-E	<i>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive (substances and agents)</i>
CCTV	<i>Closed Circuit Television</i>
COMECE	<i>Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Union</i>
CPTED	<i>Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design</i>
DG HOME	<i>Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs</i>
EC	<i>European Commission</i>
EOD	<i>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</i>
ETA	<i>Estimated Time of Arrival</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
FAA	<i>Firearms Attack</i>
GTI	<i>Global Terrorism Index</i>
HE	<i>High Explosive</i>
IED	<i>Improvised Explosive Device</i>

ISFP	<i>Internal Security Fund Police</i>
LEAs	<i>Law Enforcement Agencies / Agents</i>
PBIED	<i>Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device</i>
ProSPeReS	<i>Protection System for large gatherings of People at Religious Sites</i>
PSOI	<i>Public Space of Interest</i>
PW	<i>Place of Worship</i>
RSOOI	<i>Religious Site of Interest</i>
SOF	<i>Special Operations Forces</i>
SOI	<i>Site of Interest</i>
UAV	<i>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</i>
UAVIED	<i>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (borne) Improvised Explosive Device</i>
VA	<i>Vulnerability Assessment</i>
VAC	<i>Vulnerability Assessment Checklist</i>
VAT	<i>Vulnerability Assessment Tool</i>
VBIED	<i>Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device</i>
VWA	<i>Vehicle Weapon Attack</i>
WP	<i>Work Package</i>
WTMD	<i>Walkthrough Metal Detector</i>

Definitions

Table 2 – Definitions used in the document

Terms	Description
capability	<i>A demonstrable ability to respond to, and recover from, a particular threat or hazard</i>
command and control	<i>The exercise of authority using communications and the management of available assets and capabilities to achieve defined objectives</i>
contamination	<i>The unintended or undesirable presence or transfer of hazardous chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) substances/materials to people, objects, soil or water</i>
decontamination	<i>The removal or reduction of hazardous materials to lower the risk of further harm and/or cross contamination</i>
ETHANE	<i>A structured report to provide key information needed by the emergency services during an emergency (Exact location / Type of incident / Hazards / Access / Number of casualties / Emergency services)</i>
exercise	<i>A simulation designed to validate a capability to manage incidents and emergencies. Specifically, exercises will seek to validate training undertaken and the procedures and systems within emergency or business continuity plans (but are not a substitute for training)</i>
evacuation	<i>Movement of people from a place of actual or potential danger to a safer place to reduce their risk of harm</i>
forward command post	<i>A command-and-control facility nearest to the scene of an incident responsible for the immediate deployment and direction of resources (may be a single or multi-agency facility)</i>
hazard	<i>A substance, object, situation or behaviour that has the potential to cause harm to people or property</i>
incident manager	<i>The person with overall responsibility and authority for decisions and resources during an emergency at the place of worship or large religious gathering</i>
interoperability	<i>The extent to which organisations can work together efficiently and effectively as a matter of routine</i>

invacuation	<i>Movement of people inside a building or structure from a place of actual or potential danger to reduce their risk of harm</i>
lockdown	<i>The process of securing a building/site to prevent to keep a threat or attack outside (or delay/frustrate entry) and protect people and property inside. A 'lockdown' can be full, partial, zonal or phased depending on the circumstances of the threat/attack</i>
mass decontamination	<i>The physical process of rapidly removing contaminants form a large number of people at the same time, in potentially life-threatening situations to lower the risk of further harm and/or cross contamination</i>
police	<i>Term police in this meaning represents also other LEAs across EU, (e.g., Gendarmerie, Carabinieri etc.)</i>
protected space	<i>A location inside a building that has been developed/adapted for sheltering people from a threat or attack</i>
rendezvous point	<i>The place where emergency services (personnel, vehicles, equipment) for briefing and deployment to an incident (may be a single or multi-agency facility)</i>
safe room	<i>A room specifically designed and constructed for sheltering people from a threat or attack within a building</i>
threat	<i>An expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage</i>
threat assessment	<i>Threat assessment is the practice of determining the credibility and seriousness of a potential threat, as well as the probability that the threat will become a reality.</i>
triage	<i>The first assessment of patients or casualties to determine the urgency of their need for treatment and the nature of treatment required</i>
vulnerability	<i>The quality of being vulnerable (= able to be easily hurt, influenced, or attacked)</i>
vulnerability assessment	<i>A vulnerability assessment is the process of identifying, quantifying, and prioritizing (or ranking) the vulnerabilities in a system</i>
welcome team	<i>A team with responsibility for welcoming worshippers and visitors at large gatherings and events who are trained and exercised in security and emergency procedures to provide an increased and improved capability for the place of worship in detecting, deterring and delaying general security threats - including terrorist/extremist threats and attacks</i>

1. Executive summary

The ProSPeReS project, dedicated to the security of places of worship, in particular the protection of worshippers, involves the work of experts, police officers and officials, firefighters, scientists, and representatives of various religious communities.

The '*Guidebook on security measures for religious sites and communities*' is an integral component of the joint expert work of the consortium led by the University of Lodz.

Recommendations based on analyses, research projects and workshops have made it possible to compile a single guide covering, among others, the following items:

- procedures related to preventing a terrorist threat, and reacting after a threat has been identified;
- the Security by Design concept addressed towards places of worship;
- review of available technical security equipment and personal protective equipment to be used as part of strengthening the resilience of places of worship;
- communication protocols between places of worship staff and other entities involved in protecting places of worship and reacting in the face of an attack;
- specific, simple tools and tips for places of worship security, e.g.: Vulnerability Assessment Tool LITE version and Checklist for systemic care of places of worship security.

The recommended solutions and security concepts were thoroughly discussed with representatives of Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities, and the authors are convinced of their practicality and value and moreover, that they can be directly applied by administrators of places of worship and organisers of faith-based events.

The main goal of the Guidebook is to provide a set of procedures, solutions, and recommendations that will strengthen the resilience of places of worship in dealing with terrorist threats. In order to identify such threats and address the challenges of organizing major religious events, striving for better cooperation within the local security environment and establishing close relationships with local authorities, LEAs, fire services and neighbours are all strongly recommended.

The content of the Guidebook is addressed to people interested in increasing the level of security of places of worship but who have neither the education nor the experience related to security or law enforcement. Taking this into consideration, the authors tried to make the guidebook as simple and easy to understand as possible for the user. Guidebook Users will find links and QR-codes that refer them to relevant content and materials developed for the ProSPeReS project.

Please familiarize yourself with the Guidebook. Adopting a consistent, comprehensive approach will enable you to improve the security of your places of worship.

The '*Guidebook on security measures for religious sites and communities*' lays out a set of procedures for preventing, protecting, detecting, responding to, and mitigating the effects of terrorist attacks. Its aim is to emphasize the basic assumption of the project - to develop a simple and universal guide, the implementation of which will not require large financial and organisational expenses, and whose implemented solutions can effectively minimize the risk of a terrorist attack.

Chapter 2 introduces the user to the basics of the EU security environment for public and religious places. It defines places of worship and shows data on terrorist threats in the EU. Also, in this chapter, the user has the opportunity to become acquainted with the ProSPeReS project and the results of ProSPeReS workshops and case studies on various places of worship.

In Chapter 3, the user is presented with information on how to build communication and cooperation with local communities and individual interested persons.

The authors provide the user with useful definitions and explain why establishing good communication between multiple stakeholders and good community collaboration is vital for ensuring the safety of religious sites. At the end of the chapter, there are suggestions about ways to build and manage multi-stakeholder and community cooperation.

Chapter 4 proposes adopting more consistent approaches to safeguarding the faithful in places of worship.


The chapter helps the user find the essential elements related to the topics in question: prevention, protection, detection, response and mitigation, which are contained in the appendices attached to the Guide - QR-codes and links listed above.

Chapter 5 outlines training option for users.

Chapter 6 contains the Guidebook summary.

Relevant deliverables are included in the Guidebook Appendices. Please familiarize yourself with the Appendix.

Picture 1 – Gathering by a place of worship



2. Introduction

The fundamental aim of the policies and activities implemented within the European Union is to protect the residents of EU Member States from serious threats, including those categorized as terrorism at both the national and Union level.

The EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda, which is related to the EU Security Union Strategy 2020-2025, is a framework for building the resilience of societies against radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. The proposed activities on the Agenda shown in the graph below affect many aspects of our lives, and also apply to places of worship and religious communities.

Figure 1 – Actions based on the EU Counter Terrorism Agenda



Source: European Commission (2020). *Counter Terrorism Agenda*¹.

The ProSPeReS project corresponds to steps taken in the EU to counteract serious threats, with a particular focus on terrorism. This Guidebook, which is primarily directed at religious communities, is a collection of recommendations developed by experts, scientists, LEAs, Fire Service and representatives of religious communities, including those managing places of worship. This Guidebook is being made available in the hope that the proposed good practices and recommendations contained in it we hope

¹ European Commission (2020). *Counter Terrorism Agenda*. Retrieved on June 19th, 2021. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-security/20201209_counter-terrorism-agenda-eu_en.pdf

that it sufficiently cover your needs and requirements and be applied in your churches, mosques, and synagogues.

2.1. EU security environment regarding public places and religious sites

To begin with, the authors of the guidebook would like to systematize the selected information and definitions that will be used later in the publication to discuss public spaces and places of worship inside the European Union in the context of a security environment.

Public spaces, namely, crowded public places² including the metro, shopping centres, sports stadiums, bars, restaurants, clubs and commercial sidewalks are easily accessible to the public, but also an easy target for terrorists to do great harm³. Public spaces categories present soft target characteristics:

Table 3 – Public spaces categories presenting soft target characteristics. D 2.1 - Manual for vulnerability assessment

Category	Examples
Transport hubs	<i>Train stations, bus hubs, underground metro stations, etc.</i>
Squares	<i>Public squares, where many events take place are next to important buildings, and have regular big markets, festivals, etc.</i>
Shopping areas	<i>Shopping malls, main shopping streets in the city centre, etc.</i>
Nightlife areas	<i>Areas with a high density of bars, pubs and/or nightclubs, restaurants, coffee shops, small concert halls, etc.</i>
Cultural venues	<i>Concert halls, museums, monuments, sport events, stadiums, amusement parks, tourist sites, etc.</i>
Business venues	<i>Big hotels with meeting rooms, large offices, conference centres, etc.</i>
Places of worship (PW)	<i>Churches, mosques, synagogues, etc.</i>

² The European Union (EU) Action plan to support protection of public spaces. p.2. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52017DC0612>. .

³ ProTECT project (2021). *Deliverable 2.1. Manual EU VAT*. p. 8-10. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: https://protect-cities.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PRoTECT_Deliverable-2.1-Manual-EU-VAT_v2.0.pdf.

Institutional venues

Governmental / municipal buildings, health buildings, educational buildings, etc.

Soft targets are places⁴ that support community and economic prosperity, where people congregate to study, shop, dine, conduct business, are entertained, worship, or travel. In general, because they must be open and accessible to the public, they have little or no security.

A religious site, a place of worship - refers to any temple, shrine, site, faith community centre or religious school where worship of any religion is practiced. The basic principles to follow when designing tailor-made protection solutions for a particular place of worship are similar to techniques employed for other public spaces deemed to be soft targets: threat identification and assessment, vulnerability assessment, likelihood/consequences evaluation, selection of counter/mitigation measures as well as rehearsal and review of security planning⁵. Additionally, recommendations encompass the correct procedures to manage risks and mitigate threats against large gatherings of worshippers.

Places of worship are categorized as public spaces and are soft targets.

Why do the European Commission and the competent institutions of the EU Member States deal with the security of public places and places of worship? Unfortunately, public places, including places of worship and people located there, have often been the target of terrorist organisations, individual terrorists and armed criminals⁶.

Examples of terrorist attacks in the EU in recent years (Paris, London, Manchester, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Berlin, Brussels, Barcelona) show unequivocally that they were aimed at public places that were a typical soft target. Terrorism has for decades been a reality in many European countries and a constant threat to a great number of European citizens. The most lethal form of terrorism in the EU over the past decade has been religious terrorism. Islamic terrorist groups or lone actors inspired by jihadist groups have been responsible for 528 deaths due to terrorism in the West since 2007. The most noticeable surge in Islamic terrorism in the West was between 2015 and 2017, with 63 attacks and 457 deaths in 11 countries⁷. It seriously threatens the security, values of democratic states, and the rights and freedoms of citizens. Acts of terrorism have a lasting negative impact on EU citizens and come at a high social cost.

What are the links between terrorism and extremism and serious and organized crime?

They are characterized by the sharing of criminal services, a common recruitment pool, an overlap of suspected extremists and terrorists or vice versa and a history of criminals with extremism or terrorism. Terrorists and violent extremists are also involved in serious and organized crime to increase profits and finance terrorist operations^{8 9}.

⁴ Europol (2016). *Changes in Modus Operandi of IS revisited*. Retrieved on February 2nd, 2016. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/islamic-state-changing-terror-tactics-to-maintain-threat-in-europe>

⁵ European Commission (2020). *Protection of Public Spaces Newsletter: "Terrorism Risk Assessment of Public Spaces for Practitioners"*. Retrieved on April 22nd, 2020. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/pps/item-detail.cfm?item_id=674909

⁶ OCHA (2022). *Global Terrorism Index*. p.32-35. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022>.

⁷ OCHA (2022). *Global Terrorism Index*. p.33. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022>.

⁸ European Commission (2017). *Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT)*. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/tesat/2017/index.html>.

⁹ Europol (2022). *Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT)*. p.19. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Tesat_Report_2022_0.pdf.

To understand the importance of Vulnerability Assessment in relation to places of worship, it is crucial to analyse terrorist activities and relevant risk factors on an individual and environmental level.

If you are interested in attack statistics, you will find some valuable information below. According to GTI 2022¹⁰, there have been several distinct phases of terrorist activity over the past two decades.

Europe recorded:

- Greece was the second most affected country in Europe, with the country recording 50 attacks, an increase of 22 per cent (p.39),
- Germany recorded the second highest number of terror attacks for the region in 2021, and has the fourth highest overall impact of terrorism in Europe (p.39),
- There were 12 religiously-motivated attacks in Europe in 2020 and another 3 in 2021 (p.39),
- In addition, between 2002 and 2010, UK and France were the second and third most affected countries in Europe,
- the main type of attacks by region indicate that bombings and armed assaults are the most common forms of terrorism in most regions.

¹⁰ OCHA (2022). *Global Terrorist Index*. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022>

Picture 2 – Police on duty



According to Europol's TE-SAT Report (2022)¹¹:

- TE-SAT reports from 2021 and 2022, despite the downward trend in attacks on places of worship, still indicate that the biggest threat is still the so-called Lone Actor.
- All of the completed attacks in 2020 were committed by individuals acting alone (lone actors), using firearms or mostly unsophisticated attack methods (stabbing, vehicle ramming, and arson).

Analyses by Europol and the *EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN)* confirm that more and more attacks in the EU are carried out in public spaces using everyday objects, such as truck ramming or the use of knives to injure victims. The targets of attacks are "soft targets" selected to cause the largest possible casualties among the civilian population¹².

That is why, for decades, the institutions of the European Union, supported by the activities of governmental institutions of individual Member States, have been taking measures to keep terrorist threats, as much as humanly possible, to a minimum. They are not alone in this struggle. The European Union coordinates and shares its expertise with international organisations such as the United Nations to protect public places, including places of worship.

For more information see:

- The EU Security Strategy¹³
- The Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevention, Protect, Respond¹⁴

¹¹ Europol (2021). *Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT)*. p.19. Retrieved on July 20th, 2022. URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/Tesat_Report_2022_0.pdf

¹³ EU Commission (2020). *EU Security Union Strategy*. Retrieved on August 19th, 2022. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0605&from=EN>.

¹⁴ EU Commission (2020). *A Counter Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond*. Retrieved on August 19th, 2022. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0795&from=EN>.

Figure 2 – Map of terrorist attacks in Europe in 2020





Figure 3 – Number of terrorist attacks in Europe 2019 - 2021



2.2. General information about the ProSPeReS project

By reading this section, you will get an overall outline of the most important facts about the ProSPeReS project.

The project concept addresses the issue of places of worship considered vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their symbolic value, accessibility and the fact that limited security measures are usually in place. Consequently, they have been the target of extremists in recent years.

Data collected from religious institutions and authorities show a need to strengthen the security of places of worship.

In light of the above, stakeholders involved in the management, protection, safety, and security of places of worship should implement appropriate practices to be aware of these locations' vulnerabilities to potential attacks. This would improve their ability to identify and adopt prevention and mitigation measures against attacks of a terrorist nature, and to implement appropriate practices based on the assessed likelihood and consequences of such threats.

The scope encompassed by ProSPeReS and its activities is in line with the EU Action Plan¹⁵ to support the protection of public spaces, together with the EC Staff Working Document entitled "Good Practices, which also supports the protection of public areas," applied in the specific context of places of worship. Good practices relevant to this type of public space, identified by the EC, constitute the core basis for the project's approach and planned work.

The overall aim is to increase the security of religious sites in the European Union against terrorist attacks. The comprehensive protection system developed within the project works on the assumption that increasing the level of security of religious sites is achieved whilst maintaining the accessibility and openness of these places so believers can worship there.

The system covers measures designed to increase prevention, protection and provide deterrents in order to respond to various terrorist threats and incidents that may occur in religious places, including attacks with CBRN agents¹⁶. For example, the EU VAT methodology was adopted to cater for the needs of places of worship and constitutes a tool for informing executive authorities about tailored and appropriate protective actions based on collectively identified security needs.

The project's aim to increase the level of protection in places of worship has been achieved by forming an outstanding cooperation with scientists, security experts and practitioners, public services, and religious institutions who represent the Catholic Church, Greek Orthodox Church and Jewish Communities to prepare a comprehensive and practical protection system. Furthermore, faith-based partners from the Consortium and other institutions that represent various Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities will be consulted so their input and recommendations can be taken into consideration.

The project includes:

- vulnerability assessments,
- developing a security awareness programme for site personnel, the faithful and competent public security officials,
- the application of the Security by Design concept,
- creating links and synergies with other relevant European Union projects,

¹⁵ EU Commission (2020). *Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces*. Retrieved on February 2nd, 2023. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52017DC0612&from=EN>

¹⁶ ProSPeReS GA, p. 94

- preparation and implementation of security, prevention, detection, and response plans,
- recommendations for improvements in detection and protection equipment,
- exercises to collaborate with public services and validate proposed improvements.

The implementation of the system will be improved by preparing and initiating the following:

- distributing guidebooks and recommendations to the public (mainly to the PW communities),
- preparation of modular training, including e-learning with VR, applicable in various types of education in religious structures,
- conducting large-scale exercises,
- running a pan-European awareness-raising campaign targeting religious leaders, believers and the general public.

Recommendations issued by other international organisations (e.g., the International Conference "Safety and Protection of Religious Assemblies and places of worship", which has been organized by the consortium partners annually since 2015; Action Plan for the Protection of Religious Places, 2019) was the subject under consideration and also the inspiration for the Guidebook. They call for the development of appropriate products and tools, such as general guidelines for specific measures to protect places of worship, the development of joint training sessions, communication networks, information sharing, and early warning mechanisms and building partnerships with religious leaders and government officials to raise awareness of how to prepare for and respond to attacks on places of worship. All aspects are thoroughly operationalized in the relevant practical arrangements foreseen in the project.

The consortium consists of institutions with different, significant profiles, representing different faiths from six European Union countries from all over Europe (north: Finland, south: Greece, Cyprus, west: the Netherlands, central east: Poland, Slovakia). The strength of the consortium is the contribution of different cultures, traditions, religious practices, and its diverse approach to religion. More at: www.prosperes.eu

Moreover, the project is strongly supported by already existing, influential networks of institutions from other countries, as well as at the international level. The religious institutions of the Catholic Church represented by the Archdiocese of Łódź, the Jewish Community of Warsaw and the Holy Metropolis of Ioannina (the Greek Orthodox Church) that are part of the consortium play a key role and make a key contribution to the project. In addition, the project has received important support from Vatican officials (such as the Undersecretary of State), COMECE (EU Bishops' Conference Commission), and the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Other religious organisations have also participated in selected project activities:

- Catholic Church from Wrocław and Białystok.
- Lutheran Church from Poland.
- Evangelical Church of Finland.
- 'Faith Matters' organisation from the UK.
- The Church of Greece Representatives of the Jewish community from Leiden and Copenhagen, and the European Jewish Congress.
- Leaders of Dutch Muslim communities.

The project's approach is to prepare an appropriate, well-targeted, and validated protection standard and ensure its EU-wide benefits for the protection of religious sites through cooperation between key stakeholders. Therefore, the consortium consists of a large number of organisations, currently totalling 18, representing scientific and expert institutions, public services such as the police, fire brigades, and crisis management, as well as end users - religious institutions and operators of places of worship.

The project programme consists of 8 work packages (WP). WP1 covered project coordination, administration and quality assurance, while the remaining five WPs were strictly focused on achieving the project objectives. In WP2, the consortium identified the current state of and protection needs by assessing vulnerabilities, gathering information, conducting surveys, and sharing best practices. Then, in WP3, system elements were prepared, such as a Security by Design guide, a set of procedures, hardware recommendations, and cooperation protocols, which were consulted and approved by religious institutes. WP4 focuses on preparedness for CBRN protection. The WP4 aims to increase the awareness of religious sites' staff of CBRN agents. Moreover, the prepared reaction model will be a guide for the response in an actual CBRN crisis situation.

A training programme with face-to-face and e-learning materials was created and piloted in WP5 to initiate cascade training. Evidence-Based System Validation (WP6) was conducted as a large-scale exercise in collaboration with religious sites and public services. It included high-level and real-world activities during the evaluation sessions, including clearance. Awareness raising is an integral part of the project, Therefore a separate WP7 is planned for the entire project duration. The awareness campaign included the preparation of a strategy, a set of brochures and web materials, the use of social media, and the organisation of workshops, seminars, and presentations to raise risk awareness and develop key protection measures. Finally, the last work package (WP8) is devoted to ensuring the sustainability of the project by taking into account its dissemination (related to WP7 activities), intellectual property rights, and compliance with personal data protection and ethical principles.

2.2.1 WP3 objectives

The WP3 – Preparing tailor-made security measures for religious sites consists of the following:

- A.3.1 Analysis and assessment of the relevance of the state-of-the-art achievements in public places protection – Security by Design, novel detection technology, equipment, PPE, procedures and training, and cooperation protocols.
- A.3.2 Preparing the Security by Design guidebook for religious sites.
- A.3.3 Preparing the set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond to and mitigate the results of terrorist attacks.
- A.3.4 Preparing recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection, and protection.
- A.3.5 Preparing protocols for communication and cooperation with public services.
- A.3.6 Conducting workshops with stakeholders to validate the results.
- A.3.7 Introducing changes according to received feedback.

2.3. Results of ProSPeReS workshops and case studies regarding various places of worship

The ProSPeReS Work Package 2 (WP2) – The Vulnerability Assessment & Needs Analysis of Religious sites. The conclusions from the implementation of WP2 provided the knowledge basis for WP3 and WP6. WP2 was essential for the design and development of WP3. The main goal of WP3 was to prepare a comprehensive set of security measures using WP2 findings and relevant EU activities regarding the protection of Places of Worship¹⁷ (surveys, workshops and case studies).

Survey

The observations and knowledge collected during the workshop and case studies were highly important for determining the current state of security in places of worship, identifying gaps and needs, and implementing vulnerability assessments (VA) and risk analyses.

The VAs were carried out based on the methodology of the Vulnerability Assessment Tool¹⁸ / Checklist (VAT)¹⁹ developed by DG HOME and made available to ProSPeReS for research purposes. The objectives of WP2 are the exchange of good practice examples in current security systems and the identification of a common set of needs and gaps evident at various places of worship²⁰ that need to be addressed to enhance the offered level of security across the EU. Specifically, the aim of the VAs was to identify security weaknesses at selected religious sites and propose measures to eliminate them and prevent a potential crisis in case of an attack carried out by various means. The sites used as case studies for the workshops were indicated by the religious consortium partners of ProSPeReS and validated by the rest of the consortium. The choice of the sites was made based on their significance for the local communities and upcoming high-profile events which are scheduled to take place, and which will lead to large gatherings. The participants of VAs consisted of representatives from various local LEAs, first responders, and municipal authorities responsible for or involved in the protection of the selected sites, including the sites' operators and religious staff.

Additionally, study visits to selected places of worship were conducted to collect additional information about Security by Design issues by using questionnaires. By means of a survey, it was possible to obtain answers to the following questions:

- What elements of Security by Design are most common in the PW?
- What are the most common good practices in the PW?
- What are the most common gaps in the PW?

In addition, as a result of the questionnaire survey, it was possible to identify restrictions in the context of using Security by Design solutions. The study visits also proved that while addressing the protection solution, the different backgrounds of religious communities as well as the different types of buildings and locations should be considered.

¹⁷ European Commission (2021). EU Quick Guide to support the protection of Places of Worship. Retrieved on July 22nd 2022. URL: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8a4ef2e6-12ff-446d-9df5-1ce164adab25_en?filename=EU%20Quick%20Guide%20to%20support%20protection%20of%20Places%20of%20Worship_en.pdf

¹⁸ Not publicly available at the time of this manual's conduction.

¹⁹ In 2021 the VAT was updated and renamed Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (VAC). The updated version was made available well after the beginning of the project. However, VAT and VAC follow the exact same methodology with the addition of extra information for consideration found in the updated version of the tool.

²⁰ The terms religious sites and places of worship are used interchangeably within the report.

Identified faith-based objects include:

- Single freestanding buildings, such as a typical mosque;
- A complex of free-standing buildings, typical of Roman Catholic parishes;
- A PW constituting a sanctuary;
- A PW that is also an educational centre;
- A PW in a multi-store building.

Important findings:


The survey made it possible to identify the most common potential security gaps in a place of worship, as well as to identify good practices whose implementation in other places of worship may reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

Conclusions drawn from the analysis of findings facilitated implementation of protection measure recommendations that are as universal as possible and can be easily applied to any PW, regardless of religion, form of religious worship, size, architectural style, or building type.

Picture 3 – Large gathering



Figure 4 – Map of surveyed places of worship



The most common security and security vulnerabilities identified by the survey:

- Insufficient number of emergency exits or emergency exits designed only to meet fire regulations (they do not fulfil their functions in the event of a terrorist attack);
- Existence of side entrances that are not adequately secured and may allow unnoticed or unauthorized entry to the building;
- Possibility to leave the facility unattended inside the building;
- Possibility to leave the facility unattended near the building and people can hide near the building;
- Lack of any form of window protection;
- Easy access to installations, e.g. gas installations;
- No plan of the facility visible;
- Limited supervision of the parking lot;
- Lack of access control to public car parks;
- In one case, an unprotected gas pipe was observed outside the building facade which was vulnerable to unrestricted interference.

Workshops and case studies

Participants of the workshops consisted of ProSPeReS consortium representatives and local stakeholders involved in the protection of the religious sites. During the workshops and case studies, the participants had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with and actively engage in the process of conducting a Vulnerability Assessment (VA) in selected places of worship.

The VAT was based on the EU Vulnerability Assessment Tool²¹ (EU VA Check-list) developed and made available by DG HOME, which aims to enhance the protection of religious sites (places of worship including their surroundings) from terrorist attacks.

The workshops and case studies were a valuable opportunity for participants to see a wide spectrum of risks and threats being analysed in accordance with VAT.

The workshops and case studies' main objective, as in previous activities, was to identify the selected PW's vulnerabilities against potential terrorist attacks and to allow the site operator and the competent local stakeholders to consider appropriate solutions for the site's protection. During the workshops all eight threats/attack types included in the VAT were individually assessed for each identified zone in or around the place of worship:

²¹ Not publicly available at the time of this manual's conduction.

Figure 5 – Threat types**FIREARMS
ATTACK**

(e.g. small calibre pistol
or semi/fully-automatic
rifle- AK47)

**SHARP OBJECT
ATTACK**

(e.g. knives, machetes,
other sharp or blunt
objects)

**VEHICLE
ATTACK**

(e.g. use of the vehicle
as a weapon by ramming
large crowds)

**IED-
EXPLOSIVES**

(e.g. placed / concealed
in objects or goods)

**PBIED-
EXPLOSIVES**

(e.g. explosives
concealed on a person
(suicide or carrier)

**UAVIED-
EXPLOSIVES**

(e.g. remotely controlled
device - explosives or CBR
threats carried and spread)

**VBIED-
EXPLOSIVES**

(e.g. explosives
concealed inside
a vehicle (or its cargo)

**CBRN**

(e.g. threat object concealed
in goods or carried items - e.g.
teargas canister (chemical),
concealed in goods or carried
items (biological), threat object
concealed in goods or carried
items (radiological, threat).

3. Multi-stakeholder and community cooperation

Picture 4 – Diverse religious community



3.1. Introduction to the cooperation

It is worth knowing how to support the surrounding environment and communities for the common good, which is to increase the level of security of, among others, places of religious worship. It may often turn out that people from outside our immediate community are also the beneficiaries of our activities. Thanks to this, we can count on their support and interest in our projects. By skilfully engaging all potentially interested parties to act, we will obtain a coherent, uniform system that will improve the security of sacred places important to our community.

In chapter 3, we will:

- suggest to YOU some useful definitions and give YOU some useful theories – 3.2.
- suggest to YOU why establishing good communication between multi-stakeholder and good community cooperation is important to increase the security of religious sites – 3.3.
- suggest a way for YOU to build and manage multi-stakeholder and community cooperation – 3.4.
- resume all of the above – 3.5.

3.2. Definitions and theory

Safety and security

According to Abraham Maslow²² “*One of the basic human needs is a sense of security*” - each subject must experience a sense of security in order to be able to meet other needs. According to his theory, security is aimed at ensuring the existence and the implementation of tasks set by a given entity.

Security is undoubtedly one of the most highly valued objectives for both individuals and nations. There are many and at times competing definitions of the term. On the one hand, security often refers to the protection of individuals, organisations, and assets against external threats and criminal activities. It is the protection from directional, deliberate threats by conscious agents aimed to inflict harm on an individual, organisation, or its assets. Safety, on the other hand, means the protection from operational hazards and harmful environmental influences. Some scholars, however, argue that safety should be considered as the absence of harm and risk and security merely as the means to achieve safety. In that sense, safety obtains a more comprehensive meaning (for a discussion see Marcuse 2006²³).

It is this lack of definitional clarity that has been cause for critiques for decades (see e.g. Wolfers 1952²⁴). In the wake of 9/11 terror attacks and the perceived blurring of domestic and international security spheres, governance and sovereignty issues have gained increasing attention. The question to what extent security can still be the prerogative and responsibility of the state vis-à-vis civil society or even individual citizens has been at the core of urban security arrangements since, with a tendency to shift more responsibility to the latter in an attempt to build local resilience against threats that seem undefined in space or time (see Graham²⁵ 2010; Coaffee 2016²⁶; Kienscherf 2017²⁷).

Who are stakeholders?

Several theoretical definitions can be cited here. Therefore, for the purposes of this guidebook stakeholders are all those people and organisations that can affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by the activity and functioning of a given place of religious worship; both in private and administrative matters.

Stakeholders refer to anyone who represents a group or association with shared interests.

Stakeholders are persons or organisations that can affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to be affected by a decision or activity²⁸.

Thus, a stakeholder is every:

- clergyman / clergyperson, imam, rabbi;
- employees or worshippers;
- individual members of a religious community;

²² Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50, 370–396.

²³ Marcuse, P. (2006). Security or Safety in Cities? The Threat of Terrorism after 9/11. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 30(4), 919–929. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2006.00700.x>

²⁴ Wolfers, A. (1952). “National Security” as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), 481. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138>

²⁵ Graham, S. (2010). *Cities Under Siege: The New Military Urbanism* (1st ed.). Verso.

²⁶ Coaffee, J. (2016). *Terrorism, Risk and the Global City: Towards Urban Resilience* (1st ed.). Routledge.

²⁷ Kienscherf, M. (2017). *US Domestic and International Regimes of Security: Pacifying the Globe, Securing the Homeland*. Taylor & Francis.

²⁸ International Organisation for Standardization (2009). ISO 31000:2009 – Risk management – Principles and guidelines. Retrieved on February 2nd, 2022. URL: <https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/es/#iso:std:iso:31000:ed-1:v1:en>.

- neighbouring communities and housing communities surrounding a place of worship;
- Law Enforcement Agencies/Authorities – LEAs (Police, Gendarmerie etc.) & Fire Service;
- units of central administration.

Stakeholders are a cooperative and close-knit group who play a significant role in maintaining the level of security of a place dedicated to a given religious denomination. This is because strong and well organised local or religious communities are not only an essential element of a democratic society but most of all, a partner that effectively supports the activities of uniformed services and central authorities aimed at counteracting and combatting terrorism or crime. And it is one of the most important factors affecting the safety of individuals, communities, and specific places, including places of worship.

Achieving good cooperation requires identifying individual stakeholders and identifying the best possible practices for their cooperation.

Usually, a place of worship is looked after by a clergyman or a group of such people.

A priest, rabbi, imam, or other clergyman managing a given place of religious worship is one of the most important links whose initiative and organisational skills determine the success of building cooperation not only in a group of believers but also with the local community, which depends on whether this person:

- knows their subordinates who lead prayers and religious ceremonies;
- knows the faithful participating in the religious life of the place of worship;
- knows the neighbourhood adjacent to the place of religious worship;
- knows most of the people in the neighbourhood and can assess who are well disposed towards a place of worship in their local community, who are neutral and who downright hostile to it;
- who is in contact with other organisations, NGOs, local authorities, LEAs, central authorities, representatives of various types of emergency services, law enforcement or other domestic or foreign institutions.

Very important stakeholders are neighbouring communities and housing communities surrounding places of worship. The inhabitants who create them do not necessarily have to be associated with the religion of the places of worship. However, despite their different beliefs, sometimes they have a common interest in these places, namely, the safety of their home, family, and estate. Obtaining their support and commitment is possible if we clearly define a common goal, which is to ensure everyone's safety and that of the community in which the places of worship are located.

Knowledge of outsiders should never be ignored or underestimated. They may be neighbours who do not follow our religion, but this does not mean that as people they do not care about the safety of their neighbourhood. Building relationships with all players based on common interests (safety of the neighbourhood, district) can lead to a collective and more effective effort toward the protection of an area.

Depending on the status of a place of religious worship additional stakeholders might be:

- private companies providing supplies, assistance or performing various types of services, e.g. security, maintenance, management, etc.;
- NGOs cooperating, in particular, in various types of aid programmes, e.g. counteracting drug addiction, prostitution, crime, support for the homeless or starving, etc.;
- local authorities or local officials;
- central administration and their representatives;
- emergency services (Emergency Medical Service, technical support etc.);
- others.

Community safety and community policing

Community policing has proven²⁹ to be a very effective measure when you are trying get a good information position (who might be showing behaviour that can indicate radicalization) and to fight the crime paradox³⁰ in society. The crime paradox describes how elderly females for instance, are most afraid to become targets of crime, while young males show up most frequent in crime victimization statistics. With community policing, Police can show citizens not to worry and at the same time can protect those that do not worry, but need protection.

Note:

Community safety is much more than just community policing and enforcement.

Community safety requires that each citizen plays a key role in both their own safety and the safety of others.

Community participation and a high level of coordination between government and non-government community resources to identify and respond to the needs of the community are essential ingredients for overall success. Success requires the mobilization of local stakeholders.

The local community is often interpreted as forms covering the entire life of the inhabitants, shaping the systems of responsibility of groups and institutions, and enabling its members to meet their needs. It is about taking advantage of favourable circumstances and taking up challenges, as well as reducing the likelihood of failure by preventing and countering all kinds of threats that may affect the entity's achievement of its goals.

Local stakeholders are involved with community cooperation at a grassroots level.

²⁹ Politie Academie (2016). Best of Three worlds. Retrieved on February 2nd, 2023. URL: <https://www.politieacademie.nl/kennisenonderzoek/kennis/mediatheek/PDF/92891.PDF>

³⁰ Kappes, Cathleen. (2012). *Disentangling the Victimization-Fear Paradox : An Emotional Developmental Perspective on Precautious Behavior*.

The philosophy of community policing is understood as a closer relationship with citizens through the constant presence of police officers close to the citizen, and the local community. Poland provides an example of community policing and has created a National Map of Security Threats as part of its activities. This is a typical IT tool that serves as a communication system between local communities and the Police, which allows users together with the Police to properly identify and present the scale and type of threats they face. Cooperation with external entities has a significant impact on the implementation of the statutory tasks of the Police in the field of ensuring the security and public order of the state. The National Threat Map facilitates the creation of the educational role of the Police and the involvement of citizens in shaping public safety and order. It ensures a neutral, often anonymous dialogue between the police and the public that builds mutual trust and increases awareness of the real impact of building security in a democratic society with the participation of all entities involved in this process.

In this respect, the influence of stakeholders and the role they play in the processes of smart and safe city development are important. The local communities, economic entities, scientific institutions and municipal enterprises are important for the safety of the city at every stage of its operation.

Picture 5 – Security staff on duty



3.3. Tips for good communication

Why is it important to establish good communication and cooperation between multiple stakeholders and the local community in order to increase the security of places of worship? The painful experiences of terrorist attacks and other crimes and acts of violence directed against places of religious worship have made people realize the enormous role of individual and local organisations, unions, associations, NGOs in preventing and eliminating the effects of such acts. This is especially true in democratic societies. The authors of the handbook, based on their professional experience, subjectively believe that people are becoming better educated, trained and aware. They are realizing that their quality and living standards, including their personal safety, increasingly depend on their initiative. This also applies to religious communities, even though their main goal is the spiritual development of their members.

Safety and security providers need to take a fresh look at law enforcement methods and the way security services relate to the larger environment in which they operate as one of a variety of institutions fostering public safety and security.

Why are multi-stakeholder and community cooperation so important? Because personal awareness and accountability, rather than looking elsewhere for solutions, have emerged as key ingredients of a successful strategy.

The most effective personal tactics to enhance safety are often the simplest. Communities have frequently identified manifestations of this such as the way people feel connected to others by participating in the community, knowing their surroundings, and promoting an individual sense of citizenship. There is an acceptance that every single person regardless of their function or profession who participates or does not participate in the activities of a given community affects the safety of the general public, which is crucial for increasing the level of safety of the entire community.

It is very important to understand that ensuring security starts at the lowest level. Security services cannot be everywhere. In democratic countries, it is the commitment of the individual, the joining of individuals into groups or communities focused on the implementation of a common goal that constitutes an irreplaceable contribution to building the security of the area. Such communities, having knowledge and knowing how to support it, create a tight, pragmatic, and professional security system.

This also involves a proactive stance on the part of the citizens in which they do not wait for security services to approach and solve their problems. Instead, they use their agency to provide for their own security as much as possible.

Such practices rest on the realization that law enforcement and security services are neither omniscient, omnipotent, nor omnipresent. In other words, they cannot be everywhere and know or do everything. Even in totalitarian countries, security services have numerous limitations. Democracy gives many privileges to individuals but also requires commitment from them. Each and every individual has a far-reaching capacity to choose to act or not.

However, for multiple stakeholders to be effective together, they need to know how to communicate and collaborate to ensure and maintain a level of safety appropriate for their community.

The practice of many EU Member States, which already implement neighbourhood crime prevention programmes, proves that the cooperation of local communities with the police and creating an appropriate climate by building mutual trust effectively prevent and combat crime.³¹ Strong and well-organized local communities are an important element of a democratic society. Therefore, in ensuring the safety and public order of places of religious worship, the cooperation of the faithful gathered in a

³¹ Davey, C., Wootton, A.B., Guillén, F. Diniz, M. and van Soomeren, P. (2019) D2.4. Review of State of the Art: Community Policing, Cutting Crime Impact, Retrieved from https://www.cuttingcrimeimpact.eu/download/24-june-2019_d24_1014042550.pdf.

given community and the establishment of rules of cooperation with the local community living near the place of religious worship is very important.

3.4. Suggestions on how to build and manage multi-stakeholder and community cooperation

If you want to involve stakeholders in cooperation or establish permanent cooperation within the local community, it is best to start by:

I. Defining your vision and goal

For this guidebook, we assume that your vision is to have a safe place of worship.

The goal is to:

- increase awareness and knowledge about safety;
- establish multilateral channels of communication and information exchange between stakeholders and communities;
- create local cooperation, involving all stakeholders.

II. Choosing a leader

Firstly, it is necessary to provide a serviceable definition of a leader. Each implementation of a plan or strategy requires a clearly defined leader - a project manager. Of course, this person should not be selected at random, but be someone with proven competencies in implementing other projects or strategy implementation. The leader most often becomes a person:

- managing a place of religious worship;
- entrusted with the preparation of ceremonies;
- who is assigned to manage safety;
- who belongs to a given religious or local community;
- who is a committed person in matters relating to the religious site.

Leaders need to be able to present their initiatives, propose various types of organisational activities and use their commitment and skills to strengthen the security of a given religious place using evidence-based solutions which focus on the security of places of religious worship and believers. The most interesting will be strategies related to counteracting and combating terrorism, extremism and crime.


For example, many strategies assume that representatives of central or local authorities (depending on the needs) will have to be involved at some level. This might be, for example, the mayor, city council, or local police chief. However, the active involvement and participation of the local community are of key importance in identifying and responding to local safety problems. In fact, the community is at the heart of successfully preventing attacks or crime.

III. Creating the plan

Before we create a plan, we should gather up-to-date information about the place of worship whose security level we want to increase.

Such an initial assessment or a more extensive audit of the existing infrastructure allows for a reliable assessment and verification of the technical equipment, procedures and additional security measures. Only after having collected the above information, can we proceed with further planning.

Picture 6 – Crisis team figuring out a plan



Most organisations or project managers create plans based on basic answers to the questions: Who? What? How? When?

Example of a plan:

1. What do we want to achieve; what is our goal? Increasing the security of a place of religious worship through multi-stakeholder and community cooperation:
 - Increasing awareness and knowledge about activities so that places of worship can be made safer; for both individual stakeholders and our entire religious community.
 - Increasing awareness and knowledge of activities so that places of worship can be made safer for people who do not belong to our religious community or are not followers of our religion, but who live in the neighbourhood where our places of worship are located.
 - Establishing channels of communication and information exchange with local and central authorities (law enforcement, emergency services).

2. Who will be a leader?
3. What competencies are we looking for in the community?
4. How will we implement our plan?
 - How many people are needed to implement the strategy?
 - Officials?
 - Volunteers?
 - Professional organisations with whom we will establish contact and obtain support?
5. Who are the most important recipients?
 - Individuals from among our faithful and people living in the vicinity of our places of worship.
 - Local communities such as housing associations, organisations and associations based and operating in our neighbourhood.
 - Local governments and local authorities where our places of worship are located.
 - Police and emergency services stations whose operating zone covers the location of our places of worship and the central authorities or law enforcement agents responsible for ensuring the security of the places of worship in a strategic sense and who are therefore territorially responsible for security.
 - Who else outside the local community is needed to achieve our goal?
6. How do we want to achieve this?
 - What milestones do we aim for on the way to our strategic goal?
 - Establishing contact with the above recipients, e.g. organizing meetings, visits, training.
 - Conducting an information campaign, e.g. via the internet, leaflets, posters (this especially applies to the neighbourhood community).
 - Creating two-way communication channels, defining how and to whom we need to report information about observed events or people that may be important for the safety of our places of worship.
 - Conviction of commitment and cooperation for our cause - it is especially important to convince people from the neighbourhood who do not belong to our community but live near places of worship to be observant and notice things that differ from the typical routine of a housing estate.
7. How will we conduct an information campaign?
8. How will we educate the interested and involved? Education is understood as activities undertaken (e.g. meetings, training courses, information) aimed at increasing the awareness of individuals and a given community; educating them to the required extent, increasing the sense of responsibility for a given community and preparing for practical action.
9. What deadlines will we set ourselves?

It is important to define the deadline for implementing each action.
10. How will we check if our plan is being implemented?

Achieving the assigned tasks within the specified deadlines.

IV. Implementing a plan or strategy

To implement a plan or strategy, it is vital for all audiences that the planner/strategist:

- is clearly understood. That is, succinctly, offer specific and clear language. It should address the root causes of community safety problems.
- is pragmatic in their approach. The strategy should be realistic, based on realistically identified problems and threats. It must be as easy to implement as possible.
- engages individuals and entire communities (neighbours, local authorities, other local organisations, central government, emergency and uniformed services).

The entire community should support the strategy or it will remain a worthless document. The best plan and strategy is the one that works so it is not enough just to develop the best strategy or action plan. Effective implementation is a much more important stage.

The implementation of our plan to increase the security of places of worship with the participation of multiple stakeholders and community cooperation is based on Ronald V. Clarke³², and as usual, strong emphasis is placed on influencing potential criminals or terrorists by:

- making it more difficult (increasing the workload) for the potential perpetrator of the crime to commit a criminal act,
- increasing the degree of risk for the potential perpetrator of the crime,
- limiting the level of benefits from committing a crime,
- reducing the influence of stimulating factors on the potential perpetrator,
- making it difficult for the perpetrator to justify his behaviour.

3.5. Summary 3.2.- 3.4.

Establishing good communication between multiple stakeholders and building community cooperation is vital for strengthening the security of religious sites.

It should be remembered that any programme, not only in terms of security, must:

- be developed, communicated and made available to all involved,
- be accepted by community residents.

Activating the society and involving it in the issue of creating security for local communities assumes that the reference point for our behaviour are reactions to the behaviour of other people.

The more people act in a certain way, the easier it is for others to behave similarly as it is difficult to oppose a trend. Consequently, this makes it easier for individuals to decide how to behave or what to think.

³² Von Hirsch et al. (2000). *Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention*. Hart Publishing. Retrieved on December 29th, 2022. URL: http://www.jus.unitn.it/USERS/dinicola/criminologia-ca/topics/materiale/dispensa_1_2_ING.pdf

Nowadays, when developing community cooperation, you can use ready-made patterns. Community policing is especially effective in the European Union. It emphasizes the role of government and local government administration bodies in safety education, the main goal of which should be to increase social awareness and acquire the ability to coexist alongside potential threats that may occur in a given local community.

The freedom to initiate and participate in the design of crime prevention plans and programmes that communities now enjoy is an expression of democracy and civil society.

A local community is created by residents living in a small territory, e.g. a town, or a housing estate, with a similar standard of living and culture. It is a group where there are strong ties as a result of shared interests and needs. These communities have their own goals, tasks and problems to solve. All this means that getting to know members of this community and communicating with them provides enormous possibilities for them to influence their local environment, including its security.

Picture 7 – Checking the security list



For best results, confirm that decisions made in the name of community safety meet the following conditions:

- Evaluate existing relationships and cooperations. Consider which currently functioning elements work and which need improvement. Always take steps after analyzing current solutions, relationships and agreements;
- Establish cooperation and build partnership relations with as many people and communities as possible within the local operational vicinity of our places of worship;
- Designate leader and contact persons and ensure that all interested parties can easily find their contact details;
- Define the goals and missions that need to be achieved;
- Create an action plan according to the above-recommended criteria;
- Implement the plan;
- Raise the knowledge of everyone involved through training, lectures, meetings and information exchange.

Do not forget how important personal involvement in building a security policy is. The state has taken on the indirect role of enabler, promoting the principle of 'self-help' with the private sector filling the vacuum left by the withdrawal of public funding. Increasingly, private sector organisations have become specialists in preventative work, developing solutions to confront and combat crime, which can be sold to the private consumer, public authorities and law enforcement bodies alike.

In most countries nowadays, there is a growing trend towards law enforcement, security services, and in particular the Police, placing greater emphasis on wider society playing an active role to prevent and combat terrorism and crime.

Joint organisation and implementation of programmes, direct actions and preventative measures are having an impact that is maintaining safety and order in public places and protecting property and the environment.

Organizing joint training and exercises is another form of cooperation. An evident aspect of such cooperation is joint exercises, in which other entities responsible for safety, public order, property and health are participants. Therefore, it is accurate to say that the involvement of individuals and community cooperation tends to increase the security of places of worship.

The support of local communities is necessary for the effective operation of law enforcement agencies. It depends largely on honesty and decisions made by policemen, as well as on the nature of direct contact between citizens and police officers. The assistance and cooperation that public services receive from citizens are necessary because social order is not only the concern of the state and state administration but works towards the common good, which benefits a free society.

4. Recommendations

In this chapter, you will find specific procedures and suggestions about how to carry them out. All procedures and suggestions were created based on the findings of the ProSPeReS project.

IMPORTANT: This chapter is a review of the most important recommendations of the solutions made by the project. They are available in full in the Appendices to this Guidebook or on the project website.

All the materials presented are available to users by scanning the QR-code or entering the appropriate link that redirects you to an individual deliverable.



QR-codes and links can be found throughout this chapter. In this way, the Guidebook's authors provide you with full access to the content of the individual deliverables. You are urged to read all information relevant to you, and use the templates and tools to suit your needs and capabilities.

The ProSPeReS security measures are presented in:

D 3.2. Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



D 2.1. Manual for vulnerability assessment and VAT Lite.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection, and protection.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>




Appendix 3 – Protocols for communication and cooperation with public services.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Below, you will find the introductory paragraphs about a coherent approach to strengthening the security of worshipers in a PW. You will find all the relevant topics (prevention, protection, detection, respond and mitigation activities) in appendixes attached to the Guidebook – QR-codes and links mentioned above.

Figure 6 – Recommendations



4.1. Prevention

Prevention – in terms of terrorism, EU institutions focus on preventing radicalization, propaganda, financing, public provocation, recruitment, and training. Judging by these factors, we can define prevention as actions by European institutions to stop terrorists from gaining new members by any means and stop members of terrorist organisations from training, taking actions, making provocations, and cutting their financing supply³³.

Referring to the assumptions of the ProSPeReS project, special importance should be given to preventing terrorism (prevention) - understood, in the context of the current considerations, as a set of undertakings of state services, LEAs and local entities, including religious communities aimed at identifying the threat and preventing the occurrence of a terrorist attack through appropriate organisation of the patrol service, social and criminal prevention and multi-stakeholder cooperation with other services, guards, as well as private entities and the local community.³⁴

³³ More at: European Commission, *A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond*, Brussels, 09.12.2020, p. 8.

European Council, *EU measures to prevent radicalization*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/preventing-radicalisation/>, [Access: 03.01.2023]

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, <https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-5/key-issues/european-region.html>, [Access: 03.01.2023]

³⁴ Based on: R. Batkowski, *Counteracting asymmetric and hybrid threats from the police perspective* [in:] K. Jałoszynski et al. (red.), *Police special forces in Poland*, Szczytno 2015, p.263

“Security by Design”

In this section, you will learn about preventing attacks on places of worship through architectural solutions. Please consider what you can apply or change at your place of worship based on the information below.

Preventing attacks on places of worship should start at the construction stage. However, suppose we manage an already existing place of religious worship, using the information below. In that case, we can decide on ways to modernize the existing structure to obtain the highest level of protection. The best way to prevent attacks on places of worship or limit the effects of an actual attack is to use knowledge from “Security by Design”. It can be used during:

- PW construction planning and design,
- changes during the construction of PW,
- changes made to the infrastructure of the existing PW,
- retrofitting of infrastructure and technical equipment of PW.

Picture 8 – Architectural element: pots and flowerbeds in front of Agios Dimitrios Temple in Thessaloniki ³⁵



³⁵ ProSPeReS project (2022). D 3.2. Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites.

Suggestions:

- the best idea is to create a concept that assumes various design solutions to increase the safety of the area around the place (building) of worship.
- it is important to define the main crimes or terrorist threats through the modus operandi of the perpetrators, in the contexts in which the adopted landscaping solutions are considered. The following contextual threats were assumed when making design decisions:

Table 4 – Potential considered threats

Types of attacks	Attack modes
Firearms attack	<i>Attack against a crowd with a concealed automatic firearm.</i>
Sharp object attack	<i>Attack with concealed weapons against a crowd.</i>
Vehicle ramming attack	<i>Attack with a vehicle against a crowd near the main street of a religious site.</i>
IED explosives attack	<i>Attack with a discarded (unattended) bag containing explosives.</i>
PBIED attack	<i>Attack by a suicide bomber against a crowd.</i>
UAVIED attack	<i>Attack with a drone carrying explosive material with the intention of harming a crowd outside a religious site.</i>
Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device	<i>Attack with an explosive material placed inside a car parked near crowded areas.</i>
CBR(N) attack	<i>Attack with chemical agents outside a place of worship.</i>

Please remember:

Traditional facility protection systems focus on their capacity to physically protect a location by separating it into least three concentric protection zones.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “D 3.2. Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



For the purposes of this subsection, please pay special attention in D 3.2. Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites to the following:

Landscaping elements for the security of a place of worship that can be changed during construction, reconstruction, modernisation or retrofitting:

- benches and other seatings;
- pots and flowerbeds green (grassy or vegetated);
- hills;
- concrete seats interspersed with grass seating and trees;
- stairs with pots, greenery and benches;
- lighting;
- walls;
- fence;
- trees;
- boulders.

Picture 9 – Bollards



If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection, and protection”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Prevention against attacks at organisational, administrative and procedural levels.

In this subsection, users learn how to counteract attacks on places of worship through organisational and procedural solutions. Please consider what you can apply or change at your place of worship based on the information below.

If this is to be prevented, a clear picture is essential to raise awareness of what is needed to help local authorities and other important stakeholders within the sphere of the protection of public spaces to help better protect their public spaces against terrorist threats. This knowledge will help us introduce appropriate regulations and procedures that positively impact our organisation.

Picture 10 – Policewoman helping pilgrims



If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.



<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>


As described in Chapter 3 “Multi-stakeholder and community cooperation,” community cooperation improves the safety of places of worship and is highly important. As a reminder, one of the illustrative schemes is included below:

Figure 7 – Community cooperation³⁶



State-of-the-art analysis gives an overview of the standards, science and technologies used to protect public spaces, which can also be applied to specific types of spaces like places of worship.

³⁶ ProSPeReS Project (2022). *D 2.1 - Manual for vulnerability assessment. Regional stakeholders in the protection of public spaces.*

Figure 8 – State-of-the-art public spaces protection

Identified state-of-the-art standards and protocols are:

- The ISO Risk Management Guidelines 31000:2018³⁷;
- ISO Guidelines for crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) 22341:2021³⁸;
- The Purple Guide³⁹ – a well-known guide that describes the standards and methods that surround event management,
- The ProSPeReS Deliverable 2.1⁴⁰ “Manual for Vulnerability Assessment”.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “D 2.1. Manual for Vulnerability Assessment”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



The Vulnerability Assessment Tool LITE, created within the ProSPeReS project, aims to introduce a solid methodological approach to conduct the vulnerability assessments foreseen as part of Work Package 2 of the project, for supporting the later identified common needs and requirements to raise

³⁷ International Organisation for Standardization (2018). ISO 31000:2018 – Risk management - Guidelines. p.11. Retrieved on August 11th, 2022. URL: <https://www.iso.org/standard/65694.html>

³⁸ International Organisation for Standardization (2021). ISO 22341: 2021 – Security and resilience – Protective Security – Guidelines for crime prevention through environmental design. Retrieved on August 11th, 2022. URL: <https://www.iso.org/standard/50078.html>

³⁹ Food, Events and Things (2022). *The Purple Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Music and Other Events*. EIF Ltd, Chepstow: UK. Retrieved on June 22nd 2022, URL: <https://www.thepurpleguide.co.uk/index.php/the-purple-guide>

⁴⁰ ProSPeReS Project (2022). *D 2.1 - Manual for vulnerability assessment. Regional stakeholders in the protection of public spaces*.

the level of protection in places of worship. The approach is based on using the EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist (VAC), combined with the EU Quick Guide⁴¹ for the protection of PW, elaborated by DG HOME.

In general, a Vulnerability Assessment is a process used to define, identify, classify and prioritize vulnerabilities to attacks that stem from several factors such as the aforementioned high concentration of people combined with a lack of security measures. Vulnerability assessments also provide the organisation doing the assessment with the necessary knowledge, awareness, and risk backgrounds to understand and react to threats. A comprehensive vulnerability assessment, along with a management programme can help stakeholders improve the protection of their spaces by adopting focused and justified security measures and policies, and thus make better-informed decisions. The identification of vulnerabilities should be based on current security measures and PW effectiveness to mitigate or manage potential threats.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “VAT Lite”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>




The stakeholders involved in the management, protection, safety, and security of places of worship should implement appropriate practices (such as using the VAT Lite to help better protect their PW) in order to be aware of these locations' vulnerabilities to potential attacks. This would improve their ability to identify and adopt prevention and mitigation measures against attacks such as terrorist attacks, and implement appropriate practices based on the assessed likelihood and consequences of such threats.

The use of VAT Lite aims to provide a solid basis for a wider risk assessment process of a specific site/place. Based on the EU VAC, the VAT Lite is meant to serve as quick and easily understandable form of the originally produced EU VAC for public spaces that are generally considered open and accessible to members of the public. Examples of public spaces that can use either the Secu4All Quick VAT for all public spaces include transport hubs, cultural venues, business venues, parks, and other types of public spaces where many people gather or pass through. The VAT Lite however has been specifically designed for Places of Worship or for the protection of ancient buildings, due to their unique constructions. The goal of the VAT Lite, and in general of vulnerability assessments, is for a managing body of a specific type of building or public space, to be able to identify and analyse possible risks to their public space and more importantly, to mitigate the risks. The mitigation of risks can be done in several ways, which for PW specifically, can be found in ProSPeReS materials.

This process of (learning how to start) better protecting public space, has been described the ISO Risk Management Guidelines in four easy steps (see below).

⁴¹ European Commission (2021). EU Quick Guide to support the protection of Places of Worship. Retrieved on July 22nd 2022. URL: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/8a4ef2e6-12ff-446d-9df5-1ce164adab25_en?filename=EU%20Quick%20Guide%20to%20support%20protection%20of%20Places%20of%20Worship_en.pdf

Figure 9 – Risk Assessment process⁴²



The basic four step programme helps you to walk through the most important steps of identifying and solving possible treats to the security of your PW and the safety of the worshippers.

- **Step 1: Risk identification.** Identify possible risks, such as a possible vehicle attack, bladed weapons attack, firearms attack or CBRN-attack.
- **Step 2: Risk analysis.** To analyse the risks (for instance: how do I check if a firearms attack will actually take place?), is it important to understand two things. **1) What is the probability** of such an attack occurring? Are there any signs? Did anyone in the community mention someone forming a potential radicalized individual? And if such an attack would occur, how severe would the **2) consequences** then be?

Figure 10 – Risk Matrix for risk analysis

		PROBABILITY / LIKELIHOOD				
		Very Low (Insignificant)	Low (Minor)	Medium (Moderate)	High (Major)	Very High (Extensive)
CONSEQUENCES	Very Low (Insignificant)	Very Low	Very Low	Low	Medium	Medium
	Low (Minor)	Very Low	Low	Medium	Medium	High
	Medium (Moderate)	Low	Medium	Medium	High	High
	High (Major)	Medium	Medium	High	High	Very High
	Very High (Extensive)	Medium	High	High	Very High	Very High

⁴² ProSPeReS Project (2022). D 3.1 – Analysis and assessment of the relevance of state-of-the-art measures taken to protect public places. Risk assessment process.

Very Low/Low:

is not considered a vulnerability. e.g., the attack can be mitigated by existing security measures.

Medium:

is considered a vulnerability. e.g., the attack cannot be mitigated by existing security measures and should be mitigated by the managing body and its partners.

High/Very High:

is considered a critical vulnerability. e.g., the risk cannot be mitigated by measures that the municipality and its partners can manage themselves.

Table 5 – Risk criteria

Consequences	Probability
Crowd density	Access to weapons
Proximity to the main site (P5)	Attractiveness of phase
Existing security measures	Crowd density
Type of weapon used	Ease of access to the site
Fatalities	Ease of escape
Physical damage	Existing security
	Past incidents


Please check the risk factors.

- **Step 3: Risk Evaluation.** Make sure that before you actually decide on the outcome, you have a discussion with staff members and if possible some experts on the risk evaluation criteria. For instance, which level of risk is acceptable to you? At what level of risk do you start to think about incorporating accurate measures or asking for help of professionals that are experts in risk mitigation?
- **Step 4: Risk treatment.** Find ways to limit possible risks, based on the checklist you can find in the ProSPeReS VAT Lite for instance.

As stated above, it is easy to create procedures and check the security level of your place of worship in accordance with your existing procedures. To keep it simple, please follow the ProSPeReS procedures, methodology and tools designed to cope with the requirements and capacities of the places of worship.

Figure 11 – Methodological VAT steps – ProSPeReS

METHODOLOGICAL VAT STEPS



If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to the official XL version of the VAT Lite (the Vulnerability Assessment Checklist), go to “D 2.1. Manual for Vulnerability Assessment”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Prevention against attacks at technical and equipment levels.

In this subsection you will learn how prevent attacks on places of worship through the use of equipment and technical solutions. Please, consider what you can apply or change at your place of worship based on the information below.

“Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment to use for monitoring, detection, and protection” provides information about facility security measures such as:

Area 1 – External premises of the facility

- Anti-intrusion barriers
- Anti-ramming barriers
- Bollards
- The anti-terrorism vehicle barriers.
- Portable temporary roadblocks.
- Gates
- Security post
- CCTV system

Area 2 – Facility entry points

- Unauthorized opening of doors and windows alarm system
- Interlocking door systems
- Access control (e.g.: Biometric Access Control, Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID), Pin Code Access Control Systems)
- Turnstile gates
- Signage
- Façade
- Doors, glazing and windows
- Screening and detection equipment (e.g.: Handheld Metal Detectors, Walk-through metal detectors)
- X-Ray scanners
- Explosives detectors
- CBR detectors

Area 3 – Internal zone

- Safe room
- Mailroom
- Ventilation system
- Control room
- Water supply
- Emergency power supply

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment to use for monitoring, detection and protection”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



4.2. Protection

Protection – is one of the ways to reduce the vulnerability of public spaces and critical infrastructure. The EU pays special attention to the protection of public places, particularly the sensitive ones - "soft targets", dedicating many activities, projects, and solutions to increase the safety & security of users/people. In this context, we can also observe a significant interest in protecting places of worship.

Protection zones are:

- the peripheral zone of facility protection,
- the area whose internal boundaries are the boundaries of the protected facility; the internal zone of protection of an object is the area inside the buildings that constitutes the object.
- the external boundaries defined on an ad hoc basis depending on the needs (e.g. the number of worshippers taking part in the event). The external zone of protection of an object is the area whose external borders constitute the boundaries of the area where the object or complex of objects is located (e.g. a building, a chapel, a basilica, a dwelling house).

Places of worship protection is a term close to prevention. It can be understood as coherent and planned activities related to the organisation of PW (procedures, equipment, infrastructure, personnel) and the implementation of security systems (CCTV, anti-intruder systems, access control, etc.) to protect people from attacks and to protect property.

In the previous section entitled "Prevention", you were given suggestions for preventive measures can be taken to increase the security level of your place of worship.

The following section offers suggestions on how to increase the "Protection" level of a PW.

You are advised to pay attention to the following:

- The adequacy of the PREVENTION security level at a place of worship has a direct impact on its PROTECTION level.
- Many aspects of organizing PREVENTION are developed and replicated at the PROTECTION stage,
- The authors of the Guidebook ask users to familiarize themselves with the materials from the PREVENTION subsection before reading the PROTECTION section.
- For the purposes of this manual, the elements described in the previous subsection will not be repeated.
- The section concerning PROTECTION will only describe additional elements not mentioned previously or essential items.

For assured high-level PROTECTION at your place of religious worship, the following steps are recommended:

1. Building relationships as part of multi-stakeholder and community cooperation
(Please, read Chapter 3)
2. Introduce all possible solutions related to PREVENTION
(Please, read Chapters 4 and 4.1.)
3. Introduction of the following recommendations:

To PROTECT your place of worship

The suggestions for “Security by Design” solutions are presented in chapter 4.1. PREVENTION. They also meet the criteria for PROTECTION solutions.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Architectural and organisational aspects ensure an appropriate level of PROTECTION.

If the correct organisational solutions are put into action at your place of worship and complemented with architectural solutions, you will have an efficient system that provides the high level of PROTECTION your place of worship requires.

In addition to being incorporated into the design, architectural elements can also be used selectively to complement the PROTECTION of the existing structure. All necessary information is available in the “D 3.2. Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites” where you will find detailed and practical information on how to:

1. Establish Separate Zones.
2. Define a Public Area.
3. Establish a Restricted Area.
4. Define Border between Zones.
5. Establish a Dedicated Area.
6. Establish Access Control.
7. Define Authorized Personnel.
8. Establish Access Control Between a PW and its External Surroundings.
9. Establish Access Control to a Restricted Area.
10. Establish Evacuation Routes and Exits.

How to implement physical and technical PROTECTION

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection and protection”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



In the “D3.2. Security by Design Guidebook for Religious Sites”, “Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection, and protection” and “Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond and mitigate the result of terrorist attacks” you will find detailed and practical information on how to:

1. Employ a security company, or private security consultant or train volunteers.
2. Engage Volunteers/Staff.

Use technical equipment to PROTECT your place of worship

Subsection 4.1. PREVENTION, contains various technical solutions that enhance the safety of places of worship. These solutions also raise the PROTECTION level of places of worship so we encourage you as the user to familiarize yourself with the described in section 4.1. Below, you will find some other recommendations especially selected to increase the PROTECTION level of PW.

Protecting religious facilities, their staff, and worshippers is a great challenge, which must combine all the elements necessary for everything to function properly and not be an inconvenience to the people visiting the temple.

An appropriate and comprehensive approach to this topic often represents a substantial financial investment. This study serves as a guideline for solutions used in public buildings as a suggestion for existing applications. Not all of these solutions can be applied to every place, however, they can be a guideline to which equipment applications should be directed.

Malfunctions or inadequate preparation of a building’s security system can expose the facility to many different hazards and risks, ranging from theft to the worst-case scenario of a successful terrorist attack. A poorly designed access control system makes it much easier to launch such attacks.

One of the critical goals of the multi-level protection concept is the comprehensive implementation of security measures that integrate physical, technological, and operational standards.

From a technical standpoint, crucial factors must be covered to ensure the safety of congregation members arriving at places of worship.

The facility should be divided into several areas of interest to approach this problem comprehensively.

The adaptation of technical protection systems should be tailored individually to the specific facility’s needs and preceded by a specialized security audit.

The first source of information regarding enhancing security at a facility should be the local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) responsible for conducting operations in the particular area in which the facility is located. Cooperation with the police is particularly important with regard to updating the threat level on a daily basis and during preparation, as well as protection of an ongoing event, expert advice on procedures, and special equipment recommendations. Due to its broad, specialized expertise in

countering terrorist threats, it is a source of valuable information and support during the organisation of events that gather large numbers of people together.

Types and levels of threats

The following recommendations are intended to serve as a guide to identify ways to eliminate gaps in a facility's security system to combat given types and levels of threats. They are divided into ones covering the facility and its infrastructure and ones covering personnel. Any effort to equip the facility and personnel with appropriate technical measures should be preceded by a professional assessment of the facility's security and safety measures following expert advice to adapt them to meet the current levels and types of threats.

Due to the complexity of the problem of making equipment recommendations, they have been divided into three types of threats:

1. General terrorist acts (GENERAL).

This group includes other terrorist attacks unrelated to IED and CBRN threats. These include but are not limited to the following:

- Sharp object attack,
- Firearms attack,
- Hand grenades/projectiles attack,
- Vehicle attack,
- Incendiary,
- Hostage-taking,
- Kidnapping.

2. Improvised explosive device (IED).

IED threats include one or more incidents involving improvised explosive devices, such as:

- IED detonation,
- Explosion,
- Find,
- Hoax,
- False,
- Turned-In.

3. CBRN.

Incidents include all threats involving the use of CBR agents, regardless of whether they are triggered intentionally or unintentionally.

Intentional - CBRN incidents that involve the intentional release by states, non-state armed groups, terrorists, or criminals, with the intent to cause injury and death, cause fear and panic in individuals or a specific group of the local population.

Non-intentional - events related to industrial accidents, accidents in military research centres, related to accidents during the transportation of hazardous goods, natural sources of infection with bacteria or viruses, natural disasters leading to the destruction of industrial or military installations, and remnants of war.

However, this does not mean that every terrorist attack uses only one type of threat. Current trends indicate that terrorists are aiming for complex attacks, using all types of available weapons (firearms, bladed weapons, hand grenades, IEDs to CBR agents). Therefore, in the comprehensive preparation of a facility against terrorist attacks, all types of threats should be considered and implemented in security plans, technical upgrades, and individual equipment.

For the purposes of equipment recommendations for PW, the risk level for a given threat is determined based on the VAT light (Vulnerability Assessment Tool light), resulting from the assessed probabilities and consequences of threats.

The recommendations are expressed in the form of a table. The table is a pre-set tool designed to indicate minimum equipment recommendations based on the identified type of threat and its level.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection and protection”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



There you will find detailed and practical information on, among others:

1. CCTV,
2. Anti-stabbing vests,
3. Bullet and fragmentation-resistant vests.

4.3. Detection

Detection – in terms of terrorism, detection is the ability to detect early terrorist threats, objects, and substances of concern, and terrorists, especially by using recent technologies. In order to detect terrorist threats in places of worship, it is important to inform religious communities that gather in these places how to properly identify threats, report suspicious behaviour or objects, and raise awareness of these communities as well as give patterns of reactions in the event of terrorist threats.

The previous sections, 4.1. "Prevention" and 4.2. "Protection", contain suggestions for preventive measures that can be taken to increase the security level at your place of worship.

The following section offers suggestions on how to increase the "Detection" level of any threats against your PW.

The authors of the handbook ask you, dear User, to pay attention to the following:

- The adequacy of the PREVENTION and PROTECTION security measures taken at the place of worship has a direct impact on the DETECTION level.
- Many aspects of organizing DETECTION are developed and replicated at the PREVENTION and PROTECTION stage.
- Please familiarize yourself with the materials in subsections 4.1. PREVENTION and 4.2. PROTECTION before reading the DETECTION section.
- For the purposes of this manual, in this subsection, the elements described in the previous subsection will not be repeated.
- In the DETECTION section, only additional elements not previously mentioned or those that are so important they must be reintroduced will be described.

Picture 11 – The moment of detection of an unattended backpack



To increase the threat detection rate at your place of religious worship, we suggest:

Please, read Chapter 3 – building relationships as part of multi-stakeholder and community cooperation. It is very important to create a comprehensive system for observing and informing about possible threats.

Please remember:

Information received from outsiders should never be ignored or underestimated. They may be neighbours who do not follow our religion, but this does not mean that as people, they do not care about the safety of their neighbourhood. Building relationships with all players based on our mutual concern for the safety of our neighbourhood and district can lead to a more concerted and effective effort towards the protection of the area.

Please, read Chapter 4: 4.1. PREVENTION, 4.2. PROTECTION – introducing all possible solutions related to PREVENTION and PROTECTION strongly influences the ability to detect and reveal threats.

It is especially worth paying attention to the importance of detecting possible preparations for an attack or its initiation with the help of:

- stakeholders, neighbours
- employees, staff
- trained volunteers
- CCTV operators and CCTV system
- security company, security staff
- private security consultants

If you are interested in complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 2 – Recommendations for equipment – monitoring, detection, and protection” for detailed and practical information on, among others:

1. CCTV fitted with a facial and behavioural recognition system
2. Left item detection
3. Body Worn Camera (Bodycam)
4. Radio communication system
5. Drone solutions

4.4. Response

Response – in terms of terrorism, at the EU level is to ensure having a legal framework to act, making most of the operational support given by EU’s agencies (Europol and Eurojust), ensuring that victims are supported and protected⁴³.

To better respond to terrorist threats identified against places of religious worship in the European Union, activities are undertaken to build systemic solutions, combining resources, services, and religious communities for a coherent and effective response to the threat, limiting casualties and losses.

Previous sections: 4.1. "Prevention," 4.2. "Protection" and 4.3. "Detection", contain suggestions for preventive measures that can be taken to increase the security level of your place of worship.

The following section considers ways you may respond to threats and attacks.

Focus points to bear in mind include:

- Good PREVENTION, PROTECTION, and DETECTION security levels at the place of worship have a direct impact on RESPONSE capabilities.
- The RESPONSE level is reinforced by correctly implemented and applied recommendations, which the authors of the guidebook described in 4.1. "Prevention", 4.2. "Protection" and 4.3. "Detection". You are advised to read these sections before reading 4.4 "Response".
- All the procedures should be implemented in accordance with any national laws and respect any regional or local regulations or conditions that may be different in some Member States.
- The overall emphasis of the procedures can be illustrated as follows:

Figure 12 – Procedures alignment to security objectives



Source: Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond to and mitigate the results of terrorist attacks - procedures alignment to security objectives.

⁴³ European Commission, *A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond*, p. 2.

If you are interested in complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond to and mitigate the results of terrorist attacks”. You will find, among others, detailed procedures and information about the following:

1. GUIDE for incident managers of terrorist/extremist threats and attacks.
2. GUIDE for interoperability with the emergency services.
3. GUIDE for developing a Welcome Team.
4. ADVICE for the public to stay safe during a terrorist/extremist attack.
5. ADVICE for the public to stay safe during a CBRN incident.
6. ACTIONS to take IMMEDIATELY following a CBRN incident.
7. OPTIONS for the emergency response to a terrorist/extremist threat or attack.
8. GUIDE for evacuation planning.
9. GUIDE for invacuation planning.
10. GUIDE for lockdown planning.
11. ACTIONS to take when a suspicious item of mail, package, substance is discovered.
12. ACTIONS to take if a bomb threat-hoax is received.
13. ACTIONS to take when a suspicious item is discovered.
14. CHECKING your venue for suspicious items.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to “Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond to and mitigate the results of terrorist attacks”, by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



4.5. Mitigation of the results of terrorist attacks

Mitigation of the results of terrorist attacks for the purpose of this guidebook is the proper response after the terrorist attack to minimize its impact and make sure that investigation and prosecution of the terrorists are taken as fast as possible⁴⁴.

Previous sections 4.1. "Prevention", 4.2. "Protection", 4.3. "Detection" and 4.4. "Response", offer suggestions for preventive actions that can be taken to increase the security level of your place of worship.

The following section has suggestions on how to MITIGATE the results of terrorist attacks.

⁴⁴ European Commission, *A Counter-Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond*, p. 14

The authors of the Guidebook ask users to pay attention to the following:

- good PREVENTION, PROTECTION and DETECTION security level of the place of worship has a direct impact on your capacity/ability to MITIGATE the results of any attacks,
- RESPONSE procedures and RESPONSE reactions have a direct impact on your capacity to MITIGATE the results of any attacks,
- the Mitigation of the results of terrorist attacks is reinforced by correctly implemented and applied recommendations, which the authors of the guidebook described in 4.1. "Prevention", 4.2. "Protection", 4.3. "Detection" and 4.4. "Response". If you have not read these sections, you are advised to do so before reading the section below.

If you are interested in more complete, accurate information related to this, go to "Appendix 1 – Set of procedures to prevent, protect, detect, respond to and mitigate the results of terrorist attacks", by scanning the QR-code or using the link below.

<https://prosperes.eu/resources/>



Unfortunately, even if the recommendations made in previous sections are considered and applied, a terrorist attack may still occur.

Of course, it goes without saying that if you are engaged in mitigating the results of an attack, this means that an attack has already taken place.

There is probably damage and maybe injured or possibly even dead people.

Despite this, there are VERY IMPORTANT things that can be done even at this late stage to limit the negative impact of an attack.

An attack will usually cause chaos and panic so it is vital to focus on the following points:

1. **Cooperation with emergency and security services.**
2. **Continue evacuation from risk area (support emergency and security services).**
3. **Give first aid and medical treatment to the victims of the attack.**

Figure 13 – Reminder of the importance of first aid



Despite the stress and chaos caused by an attack, it is of the utmost importance that victims receive first aid as quickly as possible. Whether in everyday life or after an attack, the quick reaction of witnesses to an accident or attack is crucial.

Emergency services will usually reach the injured within 10-15 minutes. In a post-attack situation, this time may be extended.

Pre-medical assistance provided by people at the scene of the incident is of great importance.

Picture 12 – Giving first aid to a victim of an attack



Massive bleeding from a damaged artery usually causes the victim to bleed out within 2 MINUTES. Therefore, applying hand pressure or a tourniquet to the wound as soon as possible is crucial. Most often, these two minutes determine whether a casualty lives or dies.

Resuscitation of a person in cardiac arrest within 4-5 MINUTES is usually successful. The use of an AED defibrillator or heart massage is vital.

Section 3.4. Recommendations for monitoring, detection and protection equipment, provides, among other things, detailed information about:

- AED kits;
- Tourniquets;
- Burn dressings;
- Hemostatic dressings;
- Emergency kits.

Cooperation with security services during an investigation

Provide secured CCTV materials and share your observations with law enforcement officers. For example, your assumptions, and any information that may explain the causes or reveal the perpetrators of the attack and their associates and provide evidence during a possible criminal trial.

You can save many lives:

Please remember that by cooperating with security services, you can save many lives. It's possible that the attack on your place of worship was one of many planned. Your cooperation with the authorities may prevent further attacks and bring the perpetrators to justice.

Organize PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) support for victims and witnesses

As evidenced by psychological research and experiences from past attacks, both WITNESSES AND VICTIMS of an attack are at risk of developing PTSD or other anxiety-depressive states.

The religious community is based on mutual trust and assistance. Therefore, after an attack on a place of worship, you can still help the event participants. This is all the more true because often victims may only start to display the first symptoms of PTSD or other traumas caused by an attack several weeks or months after the event.

Surrounding your faithful with additional care and watching for signs of problems like neuroses, anxiety, alcohol abuse, or a sudden deterioration of interpersonal relationships is important so that sufferers can be persuaded to get specialized psychiatric or psychological help.

Please remember that anybody involved in a terrorist attack, both witnesses and victims, can suffer from the after-effects of such (possible) trauma⁴⁵. Also be aware of the fact that some individuals might not necessarily feel traumatized per se and that by labelling them as "traumatized", you can also cause psychological damage to individuals.

⁴⁵ Bosmans MWG, Plevier C, Schutz F, Stene LE, Yzermans CJ and Dückers MLA (2022) The impact of a terrorist attack: Survivors' health, functioning and need for support following the 2019 Utrecht tram shooting 6 and 18 months post-attack. *Front. Psychol.* 13:981280. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.981280

5. General idea of awareness and training

An important component of activities designed to strengthen the resilience of a religious community and its facilities to terrorist attacks or violent extremism will pay sufficient attention to issues related to raising the awareness of worshippers, clergy, staff, etc. Training them to prevent attacks and, in the event of an attack, how to survive it and limit casualties and other losses can be very advantageous. Other specialized forms of training using the latest technologies should be directed towards people responsible for the security of religious assemblies, etc.

As part of the ProSPeReS project, experts have created a set of specially prepared training sessions aimed at groups of people related to PW activities. Below is a general outline of the topics professionally presented in training modules available to the relevant representatives of religious communities.

Figure 14 – Related word cloud



Table 6 – Outline topics

THEORETICAL PART	Analysis of the current state of threats to PW	Importance of and need for the protection of religious sites in the EU in light of radicalization and violent extremism
		Terrorist threats in Europe. General trends and methods (e.g. car ramming, firearms, IED)
		Attacks on PW – perpetrators, methods and victims
		Characteristics of various places of worship and large gatherings of people – vulnerability and resilience
	Strategies for counteracting threats to the PW – the EU dimension	Preventing and counteracting terrorism in the EU Member States' legal framework - the community dimension
		Security by Design for PW
		Risk identification, analysis and evaluation
		Vulnerability assessment and tools: VAT for large gatherings and VAT lite
		Security Systems in PW (CCTV, Access Control etc.)
		The role of LEAs, Fire Dept., municipalities and private security sector
Competences and Capacities of Religious Communities / Management of PW		
PRACTICAL PART	CBRN threats	CBRN: An Introduction
		Chemical warfare agents
		Biological threats - Radiological and Nuclear threats
		Personal protection equipment and decontamination
		CBRN Scenarios with reactions models
	Procedures and practical aspects of protecting worshipers and religious sites	The practice of securing various PW (security management)
		The planning process to protect religious places and events
		Conducting protective activities regarding worshipers (daily activities and mass events)
		Equipment (PPE and other placed in the PW)
		Responding to threats - acting in a crisis - procedures, first responders, event management and crisis management
		Activities after an incident (e.g. psychological support, investigation etc.)
		Multi-institutional cooperation at local level (before, during and after an incident)


Training, and practice of the different stages: Prevention, Protection, Detection, Response, and Mitigation are crucial to increase security in a place of worship.

Properly trained:

- workers;
- staff;
- volunteers;
- welcome team;
- CCTV operators.

significantly increase the level of security in a place of worship.

Picture 13 – A safe family on community property



Successful implementation of the contents of the Guidebook depends on the extent to which the procedures, knowledge and technical expertise covering evacuation routes and basic first aid principles described are used.

The importance of the training process for the implementation of the procedures and recommendations described in previous chapters and particular deliveries is enormous. Moreover, all the theoretical information provided must be converted into training.

6. Conclusions

Terrorism, characterized by fear, the unpredictability of incidents, and the possibility of mass casualties, is a phenomenon that activates those responsible for security throughout the European Union and globally. However, the local dimension of security efforts should be emphasized, including activities at the lowest levels of administration - in direct contact with citizens. EU documents also underlined the importance of this aspect of activities for security: the EU Counter-Terrorism Agenda, research and reports developed during the ProSPeRes project, and materials of many other institutions, including EFUS - European Forum for Urban Security⁴⁶. **The ProSPeRes project on protecting religious places (organisations of the faithful, churches, mosques, synagogues, religious events) pays special attention to the community dimension of security activities and close, direct cooperation with LEAs, fire brigades, municipalities, etc.**

Legal solutions, competencies, and awareness of individual participants in the security management process should guarantee professionalism in the face of a threat. Preventing terrorism and effective response during an attack is the most important and most challenging action, relevant on the one hand for the LEAs and, on the other hand, essential for all members of the local community, including religious congregations of various denominations, which often live side by side and are constantly exposed to extremist/terrorist activity, not only in the form of an attack but also in the phase of progressive radicalization, violence, as well as planning and preparing an attack.

The abovementioned issues are of great importance for PW, which are open in nature and encourage people to engage in religious practices. These sensitive places, often without special protection, require professional actions and care of the facility managers for the safety of the faithful.

This Guidebook, touching on many issues related to PW security, is intended to be a real support for those who strive to improve the level of protection of worshipers and PW facilities as well as large gatherings of people for religious purposes. **The protective procedures indicated in the material, and those related to planning the security of the PW, as well as those about reacting in the face of an attack; proposals on security technologies for the PW and PPE equipment, as well as communication and cooperation protocols between the PW and other stakeholders, can positively change the local security environment.** The above was supplemented with a ready-to-implement, comprehensive crime prevention concept: **Security by Design** addressed to PW managers.

To sum up, it is worth paying attention to the **selected determinants of effective action against terrorism from the subjective perspective**, i.e., regarding people who may have an impact on the security of the PW:

- social (worshipers, clergy members, neighbours to the PW) and individual (individual) awareness of threats;
- preparation and high competencies (knowledge and skills) of the community to respond to symptoms of threats - anticipating them and appropriate behaviour in the event of an attack;
- readiness for positive cooperation resulting in the creation of bonds, integration, joint implementation of goals, creating a community that manages hazards;
- competencies, predispositions, and proper selection of a terrorist incident proving on the spot, resulting in good decisions and orders, which is crucial for crisis management;
- competencies of other participants in the institutional process of counteracting terrorism.

⁴⁶ More at: <https://efus.eu/>

The objective approach concerns, to a large extent, legal tools, material resources, and organisational solutions that serve to combat the phenomenon of terrorism effectively. **The most important determinants of effective action against such a threat, in terms of subject matter, are:**

- clear, transparent legal background and executive procedures, rules, and guidelines;
- good practice of coordinating activities, exchanging information, and alerting services and local society;
- unified definition (the same “language”), understanding, and perception of phenomena by participants in the process of counteracting terrorism as a source of effective joint initiatives;
- pro-active, universal, multi-agency prevention strategies;
- effective, optimizing activities and standards for the cooperation of stakeholders, including communities, public and local administration, LEAs, other services, and armed forces;
- appropriate individual and team equipment and armament of officers and soldiers, as well as equipment of other entities competent in the field of medical and technical rescue, etc.;
- low sensitivity of individual elements of the local security environment to threats;
- effective international cooperation.

Ten tips for strengthening security of PW:

1. Conduct a risk analysis assessment for the places of worship.
2. When planning a new location for a place of worship, consider the security measures detailed in the Security by Design concept.
3. Include the security awareness issue in your community's organisational culture, including its provision at management and strategic levels.
4. Ensure proper maintenance of the facility - order, lighting, free spaces, escape routes.
5. Consider the open nature of places of worship, monitor the available space, and apply access control for selected and non-public spaces.
6. Install appropriate technical security measures (locks, video surveillance, motion sensors, lighting).
7. Check the security of deliveries and mail.
8. When recruiting employees or contracting services, check personal data and references.
9. Consider how best to secure places of worship's data, including its information systems.
10. Plan proper behaviours / procedures in a crisis.

Source: ProSPeReS research based on materials from www.cpni.gov.uk

Finally, hope that the presented guidance and solutions will be interesting and valuable for Guidebook users. **The practical implementation of the procedures will be highly dependent on the following factors:**

- adequate training for the staff, including regular drills, rehearsals, and exercises involving the procedures;
- awareness among staff and worshipers;
- capabilities and resources to implement security technologies;
- cooperation with LEAs, public services, municipalities, and key stakeholders;
- joint planning and interoperability with LEAs.

At the same time, it should be emphasized that all procedures should be considered in the context of national laws. Any regional or local regulations or conditions that may differ in some Member States must be respected. Furthermore, consider the capabilities of relevant public services and guidance available, especially from law enforcement agencies. If you identify a potential or real serious threat, contacting the police (or other LEAs) will be necessary.

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- Appendix 3 – The protocols for communication and cooperation with public services
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- Appendix 5 – The Ten Rules
- Appendix 6 – Security Routine Checklist

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This project is funded by the European Union's
Internal Security Fund – Police under Grant
Agreement No. 101034230 – ProSPeReS